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Linse, L'indy A. r 199^ English 
The Symptom, the Sequel and the Victi.v. of Art <"95; 
Directors Veronica Stewsrt 
This pa-, per examines, the di ecc-t i eel structures of the 
f i 1 r;;s ft1 i € , Aligns, Term in a tor and T erm inator II: 
J a d g r.ext Day f r o m t n€ p e r s p e e i v e cf Lac a n i a n 
psychoanalysis. The analysis reveals structural 
si nii1arilles bet ween t he t wo A1ien f i1ms and hysteri a a id 
between the two Ter mi nat or films =\rd paranoia, while 
focusing cm problems of susp ens.on c f disbelief as 
dependent upon processes of spectator/reader 
i -1 e: 111 fie a 1 o n wit h t h e c H a r a c t e r s o f a n srr c i ve, a n 
i ssuo central in the history of literary criticism. 
T hi i n t r o c u c t ci r v c hi a zi t •;> r f 11 r r o ri i F' .1 a t C''s L- h a i r t c 
Cassiopeia's Ch.^iv r " briefly discusses Lac an * s theory of 
t hi e m i r r or stage, its r el at i o ;-i to critical the o r i e s c f 
readtr i den t i f i c at i on with the heroCirie) of a text and 
problems arising out of literary theory's confusion 
between trie .ideal ego and the ego ideal which tends to 
make art an object causing desire, and the reader a victim 
of a rt. 
"Hysterical Alienation, Hysterical Recuperation" 
delineates the structural similarities between the Alien 
f i 1 ins and hysteria, posi t i ng ft 1 ie;? as t he c i nema o f 
symptom and the sequel , f41 i&ns, as cinema c t curt-. Sp ec i al 
attention is paid to the w^ys t h films, i r. mimicking 
structural aspects of hysteria, inscribe pcsi ti jr.s for the 
spectator within the diegei^is. Lac an i an concepts of 1 ne 
phallus and the sin thon><£ are crucial to this discussion. 
"Men Miracled Up and Cursory Contraptiors" elaborates 
the relation between the Terminator films and the 
struct u r es o f paranoia while f oc u s inq on tht spe ctator's 
inscription in the ciegesi s. Thi analysis is supported by 
aspects of the Schrcber case, post-modern 
m e c  h a n o — e r  o t  ±  c  .i  s n  a n d  L a c  a n  r  s  t h e o r i e s  o f  t h e  
N a m e—o f — the—Father , d e sire a n d m e t a p h o r a n d m e t o r, y rr. y. 
The conclusion, "The Viztims of Art," links the 
preceding analyses to the history of literary criticism, 
returning c o the p r ob 1 er/. of the suspension of disbelief 
and the process of identification. Ideas be r rowed f r orn W. 
H. Abrams, Walter Qnq, Jacques Derrida, Maurice Blanchot 
and research in Artificial Intelligence interact with 
Lacan's theories of sinthome and the signi fier as-
constitutive of subjectivity, as expressed in his Semi nar 
on Foe's "The Purloined Letter," to outline- a position in 
the te„t from which the reader/spectator is net prey to 
identi f icaticr, processes and is rot the vi ctin, of art , 
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From Plato's Chair to Cassiopeia's Chair 
By Way of an Introduction 
This being an introduction, it partakes, as do all 
introductions, in that sort of retroactive reading best 
summed up in the phrase "20/20 hindsight" in that it is 
supposedly written after the fact to inform the reader of 
the gist of the pages to follow. But I have never had 
perfect vision. It is at this point that I enter the 
discourse of the hysteric. Confronted with the che vuoi, 
the demand of the Other (what I imagine the institution 
and its representatives, my thesis committee, to expect of 
this thesis—"So, what are you trying to prove by 
diagnosing movies, Cindy?"), I find myself paralysed by an 
inability to answer. Somewhere in the split between this 
demand and my desire to say 'I am that I am; I did it 
because I did it,' I am caught up in the logic of the 
hysterical demand which Slavoj Zizek, in The Sublime 
Object of Ideology, articulated thus: "'I'm demanding this 
of you, but what I'm really demanding of you is to refute 
my demand because this is not it'" (Zizek, 112). In other 
words, one never asks the hysteric what he or she wants, 
what he or she means, because, whatever he or she answers, 
that won't be it. 
Be that as it may, if I were to be as honest as I 
1 
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possibly could be, 1 would have to say that I have no 
excuse, no intention in diagnosing movies beyond the pure 
jouissance of the bricoler, the tinkerer; my sole intent 
having been—to the best of my knowledge—only to take 
things apart and rearrange them. But inherent to this 
pleasure, which stands now in the position of my 
hysterical falsehood, lies the immanent drive to mastery. 
And indeed, through the process of writing, rny 
understanding of Lacan's theories, however tenuous it 
still must be, has increased on an exponential level. 
But this in itself cannot constitute the desire to 
diagnose movies, which must always lie elsewhere, in the 
place of the Other from whence desire speaks itself. Here, 
in the nexus between desire and mastery, I find the 
Lacanian mirror stage as it relates back to the topic at 
hand, film. In articulating the formation of the subject, 
Lacan posits that the infant, at one point, identifies 
itself in the mirror with both the infant in all its lack 
of motor control and the more powerful mother in whose 
arms it is supported. The mirror is optional, providing a 
means to envision the event; what should be apparent in 
this is the narcissism of the move toward mastery inherent 
to subject formation. In "The Mirror Stage as Formative of 
the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic 
Experience," Lacan expresses the relation between mirror 
stage and mastery thus: 
3 
This development is experienced as a temporal 
dialectic that decisively projects the formation 
of the individual into history. The nirror- stage 
is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated 
from insufficiency to anticipation—and which 
manufactures for the subject, caught up in the 
lure of spatial identification, the succession 
of phantasies that extends from a fragmented 
body-image to a form of its totality that I 
shall call orthopaedic—and, lastly, to the 
assumption of the armour of an alienating 
identity, which will mark with its rigid 
structure the subject's entire mental 
development" (Lacan, 4). 
This misrecognition (neconnaissance) will later found the 
split in subjectivity experienced through the intervention 
of the Law-of—the—Father (one may imagine Dad arriving on 
the scene to tell Mom to leave Baby because the green 
beans are burning), and the consequent language 
acquisition becomes the subject's mode to mastery in place 
of the doubled, roisrecognised imago child/mother (one may 
imagine Baby discovering that Morn can be summoned back to 
the mirror by uttering the cry, "Mommy"). Of course, this 
explanation is grossly simplified, but one sees in it that 
the infant at one point realizes that the satisfaction of 
its needs relies upon the actions of another, which the 
acquisition of language is meant to facilitate. Uihat is 
not so obvious is that the point at which the infant has 
not realized the discontinuity between its satisfaction 
and the Other remains even after he or she has become a 
fully operational subject in language. For Lacan, this 
mirror stage misrecognition will play a part in all 
subsequent subjectivity: 
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The fact is that the total form of the body by 
which the subject anticipates in a mirage the 
maturation of his power is given to him only as 
6estaltr that is to say, in an exteriority in 
which this form is certainly more constituent 
than constituted, but in which it appears to hirn 
above all in a contrasting size Can relief de 
stature") that fixes it and in a symmetry that 
inverts it, in contrast with the turbulent 
movements that the subject feels are animating 
him. Thus, this Gest-alt—whose pregnancy should 
be regarded as bound up with the species, though 
its motor style remains scarcely 
recognizable—by these two aspects of its 
appearance, symbolizes the mental permanence of 
the /, at the same time as it prefigures its 
alienating destination; it is still pregnant 
with the correspondences that unite the I with 
the statue in which man projects himself, with 
the phantoms that haunt hirn, or with the 
automaton in which, in an ambiguous relation, 
the world of his own making tends to find 
c ornp 1 et i on " < 2 > . 
Herein lies the problem which has plagued theories of 
the aesthetic ever since Plato's Republic—all theories of 
the suspension of disbelief, reader identification with 
the characters, realism and organic wholeness. Perhaps 
these theories would not pose a problem but for the fact 
that in attempting to uncover what it is that makes a 
reader suspend disbelief, the theory inevitably ends up on 
the terrain of cause and effect. Plato was not so much 
concerned with art, especially poetry, as an imitation of 
an imitation as he was with the way in which he felt it 
misled people from appreciation of the true, Ideal object. 
Of course, he also posited this Ideal (chair) as being 
something so irremediably outre and other that only the 
philosopher had access to it, and then only through a 
shadowy glimpse of its outline. If Plato, the philosopher, 
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had met Lacan, the psychoanalyst, he might have glimpsed 
that his Ideal chair consisted of no more than the desire 
to sit comfortably, in which case the representation, the 
physical chair, would be no closer to the desire to sit 
comfortably (Ideal chair) than the artistic representation 
would. Be that as it may, in positing that art's supreme 
falsehood beguiled the reader/spectator into believing in 
second rate truth and beauty, Plato's complaint against 
the poets sets up all subsequent arguments, from Aristotle 
on, to make of art an objet petit a in the sense of Stuart 
Schneiderman's definitions "an object which causes someone 
to desire" (Schneiderman, 7) and to make of the 
reader/spectator a victim of art. All theories of reader 
identification and organic wholeness partake of a certain 
conflation or, more precisely, an elision of the ideal ego 
with the ego ideal. Ellie Ragland-Sul1ivan succinctly 
differentiates these two in Jacques Lacan and the 
Philosophy of Psychoanalysis: 
Hence, Freud's nascent concept of ideal ego 
would refer to primordial narcissistic fixations 
(primary identification>, while the ego ideal 
that Freud had described so extensively would 
correspond to secondary identification with 
others. Placed in the secondary realm of 
language and exchange, the function of the ego 
ideal (one's own alter ego as reflected in 
others) is to command the play of rel ationships. 
Within a Lacanian purview, the ideal ego is 
linked to a primordial sense of the self as it 
enters into the projection of one's being in 
requests or demands, while the ego ideal is the 
reflection of one's idealized »oi identity in 
the secondary narcissism of rel ationships" 
(Ragland—Sul1ivan, 54). 
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Theories of organic wholeness, the sublime and moral 
uplifting or the aggrandisement of the reader through 
identification with a hero(ine) all play upon the primary 
meconnaissance of the mirror stage while simultaneously 
attributing to this effect a function of secondary 
identification through realism. In other words, the reader 
believes in the text because he or she recognizes himself 
or herself in the realistic portraits of the characters 
and because he or she desires the completion and 
aggrandisement promised at the end, i.e. the reader is the 
victim of the manipulations of an art that mimes reality 
while promising that, should the reader buy into it he or 
she will be a larger more complete person. 
The problem with this pattern of identifications is 
best stated by Ragland-Sullivan: 
By seeing a convergence between ego (Lacan's 
moi) and ego ideals (Lacan's others) in dreams 
and hypnosis, Freud confused both as objects of 
Desire, representing wish fulfillment. Lacan's 
efforts have gone in the opposite direction; he 
tries to maintain a distance between the ideal 
ego and ego ideals (alter ego) and to separate 
both of these from the mechanism of desiring. In 
this way the subject can survey itself in its 
fundamental fantasies and displacements, instead 
of disappearing into the identificatory 
exclusion and closure of 'apparent sameness,' 
which occurs in the relating of ideal ego to ego 
ideals in rel ationships" (54—55). 
In diagnosing the movies Alien, Aliens, Terminator- and 
Terminator II, I will be looking at the ways in which the 
ideal ego and ego ideals manifest themselves within the 
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psychic structures these films elaborate, leading to a 
discussion of aesthetics which puts to rest the concept of 
reader/spectator as victim of art. 
By some happy accident (I took courses in Literary 
Theory and Astronomy in the same quarter)r Plato's Ideal 
Chair has been hopelessly confused in rny imagination with 
the celestial constel 1 ation, Cassiopeia's Chair. On warm, 
summer nights, when I gaze up into the sky, I see that 
group of stars and think, "There's that Ideal Chair." And 
maybe that is the best place for Plato's chair, out there 
where we cannot sit in it. 
Hysterical ienation, Hysterical Recuperation: 
Configurations of the M(0)ther in Ridley Scott's Alien and 
James Cameron's Aliens 
"Man has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic God. 
When he puts on all his auxiliary organs he is truly 
magnificent; but those organs have not grown on to him 
and they still give him much trouble at times." 
(Civi1ization and Its Discontents, 
38-39) 
In The Imaginary S ign i f ier f Christian Metz proposes 
that the filmic state, as he calls it, borders on the 
dream—state; the subject/spectator apprehends the film in 
much the same way that he or she apprehends a dream. But 
Metz is also aware of a dissymmetry between the filmic 
state, and the dream—state, and he claims the filmic state 
is both more effective and less effective: more powerful 
because the conscious mind is aware that the images really 
are physically present, less powerful because those images 
are not the product of the subject/spectator's own 
unconscious. Given this double—bind, how .does the 
subject/spectator avoid defense mechanisms and enter an 
apprehension of the film which directly opposes these 
forces. Metz poses this same question thus: 
...how does the spectator effect the mental leap 
which alone can lead him from the perceptual 
donnee, consisting of moving visual and auditory 
impressions, to the constitution of a fictional 
universe, from an objectively real but denied 
signifier to an imaginary but psychologically 
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real signified?" (Metz, 116). 
In answer, Metz proposes that "...the spectator's 
defenses...roust be integrated with the very content of the 
film ...in such a way that the subject can avoid 
activating his own defenses" (ibid.). Based on Metz's 
insight, I would like to propose two interpretations of 
how this integration of defenses is accomplished in Ridley 
Scott's Alien and James Cameron's A1iensi the cinema of 
symptom and the cinema of cure. 
In presenting itself as symptom, the cinema minimizes 
disbelief by aligning itself with the forces of the filmic 
state*, placing the sub jec t/spec t at or in the position of 
the subject supposed to know, of the analyst, if you will. 
It plays on the field of conscious ego operations by 
affirming the distancing effect of both the reality of the 
signifier and its status of being another's images, 
allowing the subject/spectator to assume a 
non-threatening, external position of mastery, even if 
only a symbolic mastery. In other words, it presents 
itself in such a way as to say yes, these are real images, 
but they are not your images; they are a mystery for you 
to solve, symptoms for you to decipher. It is this call to 
decipher, no more than the conventional opening of any 
mystery or suspense thriller, that is inscribed in the 
content of the beginning of Ridley Scott's Alien; the crew 
of the Nostromo are summoned from their cryogenic sleep by 
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the ship's mainframe, Mother, to investigate an 
unidentified signal, the Che wuoi? of the Other. By 
articulating the Other's question, the film engages not 
only the crew, but the subject/spectator as well, to 
function in the position of analyst, the one to whom the 
symptom is addressed. As Zizek has written in 7he Sublime 
Object of Ideologyf 
The subject is always fastened, pinned, to a 
signifier which represents him for the other, 
and through this pinning he is loaded with a 
symbolic mandate, he is given a place in the 
intersubjective network of symbolic relations. 
The point is that this mandate is ultimately 
always arbitrary: since its nature is 
per formative, it cannot be accounted for by 
reference to the 'real' properties and 
capacities of the subject" (Zizek, 113). 
At the level of the film, this arbitrary element is 
expressed when two of the crew contest the summons to 
explore, demanding to be paid extra for the extra duty, 
but they are reminded that it is in a subclause of their 
contracts. The mechanics, Parker and Brett are pinned to a 
signifier and symbolic mandate (that of investigator) 
outside of their 'real' subjective capacities as 
mechanics. At the level of the spectator, the signifier 
and symbolic mandate were, to some extent, implicit in his 
or her act of purchasing a ticket; the spectator came to 
find out about the alien of the title. But it is within 
this scene that the mandate enters the diegesis of the 
film as performative role, and it is at this point that 
the spectator, outside of any real capacities, is called 
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upon to identify his or her implicit mandate as reified in 
the performative role delineated by the film. 
This would seem to imply a certain amount of 
secondary cinematic identification with the crew (not to 
be confused with psychoanalytic identification, cf. Metz, 
54—5£!> . But one aspect of the cinema of symptom is a 
constant undermining of this sort of identification. 
Cinema as symptom depends on the distancing of the 
spectator's unconscious from the signifier of the film in 
order to avoid the overwhelming of the ego and instinctual 
defense mechanisms. The cinema of symptom relies on the 
maintenance of the primary cinematic identification in 
which the spectator identifies with his or her own gaze as 
inscribed in the film and denies the sort of regression to 
mirror-stage aeconnaisance implicit to identification with 
a character. Ridley Scott's film accomplishes this through 
a nearly equal weighting of character importance. In 
Alien, the crew interacts as separate but equal 
individuals: Dallas is the Captain, but Ash, the Science 
Officer, also has authority, as do Ripley, who is 
second-in-cotrimand, and Parker, the Chief Mechanic, in his 
area of jurisdiction. As the spectator moves through the 
diegesis, different characters function as acting subject 
so that secondary cinematic identification is continually 
broken. Beyond the mechanisms of the "Ten Little Indians" 
plot structure borrowed from Agatha Christie, which tends 
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to equate importance and power with survival, the crew of 
the Nostromo are seen to operate like the cogs of a 
machine; each performs a function without which the whole 
cannot hope to survive. It is only in the end, when Ripley 
becomes the "last little indian," that the spectator gains 
a single focal point for identification. 
This distancing is enhanced by the predominance of 
those third-person-omniscient camera shots typical of the 
horror genre; the subject/spectator usually knows where 
the alien is before the characters do and is always 
prepared for the coming action by the camera work and/or 
the sound track. In addition to interrupting the process 
of identification, this reinscribes the 
subject/spectator's position as the subject supposed to 
know, and maintains the primary cinematic identification 
with his or her own gaze. 
A further element of the diegesis highlights this 
position and in fact marks the place where the 
subject/spectator truly engages the network of 
signification and the mandate it imposes. Approaching the 
source of the signal, the crew discovers what unmistakably 
represents female anatomy; the alien vessel, of gigantic 
proportions, has two tail fins strongly resembling spread 
legs and between them an explicitly vaginal opening. The 
image is so overt as to be obtrusive, almost comical. Here 
the film presents a blatant representation of the primal 
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scene, the phantasmatic vision of parental coupling 
leading to the discovery of the mother's lack of a penis, 
which cornes to the spectator via a fuzzy and broken video 
transmission from off—screen characters. The distortion of 
the camera—work, far from undoing the heavy—handedness in 
the presentation of the image, serves to heighten its 
distancing and point it out as a subtext. As Metz states, 
...the ordinary framings are finally felt to be 
non—framings: I espouse the film—makers 
look...but my consciousness is not too aware of 
it. The uncommon angle reawakens me 
and... teaches me what I already knew. And then, 
it obliges my look to stop wandering freely over 
the screen for a moment and to scan it along 
more precise lines of force which are imposed on 
me. Thus for a moment I become directly aware of 
the eippiace®ent of my own presence-absence in 
the film simply because it has changed" (Metz, 
55, italics his). 
The distortion of the camera—work indicates the 
spectator's point d<s capiton, the symbolic mandate 
signified in the image of the primal scene. Even the 
spectator uninformed by psychoanalytic theories, and so 
much the better if he or she is not, is aware that this 
image represents at least a clue. Thus what follows passes 
uncensored by the subject/spectator's conscious conception 
of reality because this reality principle is reconstituted 
within the diegesis by the very signifier that pins him or 
her into the signifying chain of the film and issues the 
arbitrary, symbolic mandate. It is a space ship, something 
existing only in imagination, but it is marked by 
familiarity, a familiarity that functions even more 
u 
powerfully if not recognized by the conscious and 
interpreted by theories of Oedipal crisis. 
This scene is also a signpost mobilizing and 
preparing the subject/spectator for the manifestation of 
the hysterical symptom that almost directly follows it. 
After entering the "castrated" Mother through the vaginal 
opening, one member of the crew discovers eggs. That his 
name happens to be Kane (homonym—Cain and cane) is yet 
another nexus in the signifying chain which plays on 
Biblical references to subjective failure to appease the 
desire of the Other, recalling the che vtioi? and the 
hysteric's crippling failure to answer. Here, the form of 
the symptom is determined, and Kane, through his name, is 
pinned to the impossible signifier and its equally 
impossible symbolic mandate: Man's desire is the desire of 
the Other. Zizek states: 
What is hysteria if not precisely the effect and 
testimony of a failed interpel 1 ation; what is 
the hysterical question if not an articulation 
of the incapacity of the subject to fulfill the 
symbolic identification, to assume fully and 
without restraint the symbolic mandate?" (Zizek, 
113) . 
And in true hysterical fashion, Kane refuses the 
castration of the m(0)ther by "catching" the maternal 
function in the same way that we say we have "caught a 
cold." While this statement is an overt acknowledgment to 
being overwhelmed by a virus, it is implicitly an attempt 
at radical mastery. In saying that I have "caught a cold," 
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I imply that I have the little bugger right where I want 
it, in my lungs and sinuses. Thus, when Kane inhales the 
maternal function, it is at one and the same time an 
adniission that the ego has been overwhelmed while it 
maintains a radical mastery of castration on the level of 
signi fication. Freud says, in "The Neuroses of Defence," 
"Hysteria begins with the overwhelming of the ego, which 
is what paranoia leads to. The raising of tension at the 
primary experience of unpleasure is so great that the ego 
does not resist it and forms no psychical symptom but is 
obliged to allow a manifestation of discharge—usually an 
excessive expression of excitation" (Freud, 96). So here 
we have the beginnings of a symptom for our cinema of 
symptoms the symbolic and somatic expression of castration 
fears. Overwhelmed by having fallen through the blue haze 
obscuring knowledge of the maternal aanque d'etre which 
pops out of an egg, attaches its penis—like representamen 
to his oral orifice and begins insemination without 
resistance; Kane goes into a coma much like the 
overexcited swooning of yesteryear's woman. 
According to Lacan, what is repressed at the level of 
the Symbolic erupts in the Real, and the Real is the 
territory of the Thing, "the material left—over, the 
materialization of the terrifying impossible jouissanee" 
(Zizek, 71, italics his). In terms of the diegesis of 
Alien, the symptom will erupt as the Thing from Kane's 
'1  o  
chest; a bizarre reenactment of the birthing process which 
will lend it all the attributes of hysterical somatization 
while inscribing it as a fetish replacing the m(0)ther's 
missing phallus. This fetish is further elaborated as 
partial object by the camera work which resists giving the 
spectator a full view of the alien. It consumes, one by 
one, the crew of the Nostromo, achieving its penultimate 
expression in the penile head of the alien backlit in blue 
just before Ripley blows it out the airlock to make it a 
foreclosed signifier in the void of unrepresentable 
desire, deep space. 
The dominant actions outlined by the plot bear in 
common an outward movement: the crew goes out of the ship 
to decipher the signal, the alien erupts out of Kane's 
chest, and is eventually blown out of the airlock of the 
escape module after Ripley takes it out of the Nostromo. 
The dominance of an externalizing movement is another 
indication that this film partakes of the cinema of 
symptom, for what is the symptom if not a deceitful 
externalization hiding while indicating a repression. Of 
course, there are internal movements in the diegesis of 
Alien, but the external movements bear the emotional 
thrust because the Nostromo is inscribed with the mar k of 
the maternal: its exterior breast-like cups, the womb-like 
chamber of Mother, the ship's mainframe, its separate 
nurturing environment as opposed to the hostile void of 
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space; to go out is tantamount to a threat of immanent 
death. And, in terms of the genre, there are comparatively 
few external shots of the Nostromo and its position in 
space, which serves to reinforce the idea that outside is 
death, that sort of death of the unrepresentable, death by 
eradication of the signifying chain. So this external 
movement, by reifying the thrust of symptom, serves to 
remind the subject/spectator of the safety distance by 
implicitly addressing hirn or her as an outside toward 
which the diegesis moves while it also functions to pin 
the subject/spectator to the symbolic mandate by 
reinscribing him or her as gaze within the field of 
representability, staving off the effects of outside as 
death, the destruction of the signifying chain which he or 
she has been called to decipher. 
Along the lines of external/internal movement, 
preoccupation with the devouring symptom masks another 
element centered on the desire of the rn(0)ther in the form 
of the ship's mainframe. The figure of the cyborg, Ash, 
who functions in the place of Mother, consistently enacts 
a hidden desire which supports the alien to the detriment 
of the sub jec t/crew. It is Ash who count er rnands Ripley's 
order that the crew and Kane remain in quarantine; it is 
Ash who hides from Ripley whatever information he has got 
under the microscope, and it is Ash who tries to kill 
Ripley when she discovers that Mother is operating under a 
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directive to bring back the alien—crew expendable. 
Mother, the computer, the internal, comes to represent 
unconscious desire as Lacan describes it in Agency of the 
Letter, 
...there is no other way of conceiving the 
indestructibility of the unconscious desire—in 
the absence of a need which, when forbidden 
satisfaction, does not sicken and die, even if 
it means the destruction of the organism itself" 
(Lacan, 167 >. 
This dichotomy of externalized symptom/internalized 
desire further inscribes Alien as cinema of symptom by 
delineating a relation between desire and knowledge that 
reiterates the state of neurosis. In the film, knowledge 
is always elsewhere, imputed to the subject/spectator 
through earner a—wor k and sound track, and M(0)ther's desire 
is hidden until the end. Never do we come to any 
understanding of the alien as a sentient being motivated 
by desire, unlike the sequel. The alien remains, 
throughout the film, as Ash describes it, "... the perfect 
organism. Its structural perfection is matched only by its 
hosti1ity...I admire its purity, a survivor unclouded by 
conscience, remorse or delusions of morality." Not until 
this confrontation with the computer, Mother, through Ash, 
do we discover that the alien is the representative of 
desire. We have, all along, assumed that Mother desired 
the crew, operated on the crew's behalf to their benefit. 
There is a short circuit here between knowledge and desire 
indicative of symptom. To quote Zizek: "The hysterical 
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question opens the gap of what is 'in the subject more 
than the subject', of the object in subject which resists 
interpellation—subordination of the subject, its 
inclusion in the symbolic network" (Zizek, 113, italics 
his). It is the foreclosure of this object in subject, as 
Ripley blows the alien out the airlock, that will fix the 
gap, cement the question and preclude any hope of an 
answer. 
Ripley has already exploded the unconscious desire, 
the Nostromo and Mother with it, in a sequence filmed 
under stroboscopic lighting which signals the foreclosing 
of jouissance and marks the immanent break—up of the 
signifying chain. And this final foreclosure, the ejection 
of the "Thing" into the void of the field of 
unrepresentabi1ity signals the release of the 
subject/spectator. While the performative position of 
subject supposed to know has allowed him or her to 
apprehend the film without arousing defense mechanisms, 
the fact of the foreclosure pushes this distancing to the 
point of disinclusion in the signifying network. The 
subject/spectator leaves the cinema slightly disoriented, 
the hysterical question still in place. In no way does 
this mean to imply a "bad" cinema experience, merely that 
the terrible, repulsive attraction of the alien is fixed 
in relation to the subject/spectator. 
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James Cameron's Aliens, as cinema of cure, operates 
against the grain of those lines of force outlined by 
Christian Metz; while it never denies the reality of its 
signifier Cthis would be quite counterproductive for the 
film), the cinema of cure definitely works to minimize its 
reality by consistently utilizing those ordinary framings 
which are felt to be non-framings. The camera-work is 
predominant1y third person, and the spectator readily 
espouses the film—maker's gaze. But it is a gaze without 
the omniscience of the Scott film. A high frequency of 
close-ups of Ripley paired with shots espousing Ripley's 
gaze serves to circumvent the incredibility of another's 
images by encouraging secondary cinematic identification. 
The spectator's defenses are overcome by the promise of 
the cure through the inscription of the phallic signifier 
within the diegesis of the film. Lacan says, in "The 
Signification of the Phallus," "The phallus is the 
privileged signifier of that mark in which the role of the 
logos is joined with the advent of desire" (Lacan, 287). 
In other words, through paternal intervention in the 
mirror stage, both language and desire are born, and in 
Lacanian terms both operate under the aegis of the 
phallus, which is neither the penis nor the father proper, 
but has to do with his various manifestations as Law or 
Name as the marker of a certain "fall into subjectivity." 
The subject/spectator's mandate concurs with the 
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inscription of the phallic signifier where it joins the 
role of logos (the film) with the advent of desire Cthe 
spectator's), and as Ripley becomes the diegetical site of 
investment for the phallic signifier, joining both Law and 
Name, both 1ogos and desire, she becomes the object of 
secondary cinematic identification. As the film progresses 
it becomes a case of "when Ripley speaks, everyone 
listens." She fulfills the role of desire by being 
desirable to the spectator both as the one who will 
survive and desirable through the inscription of Corporal 
Hicks' desire. Additional1y, much of the diegesis follows 
Ripley's desire to protect both Newt and the troops. If 
you will, the phallic signifier guarantees accession to 
subjectivity as long as the spectator plays along, assumes 
the symbolic mandate to identify with Ripley. 
The intent to cure is signalled in the opening scene. 
Ripley is "rescued" by a "deep salvage" team. It is at 
this point, also, that the film inscribes the symbolic 
mandate to identify with Ripley in an overdetermined 
lap—dissolve from Ripley's face to a space—eyed view of 
planet earth. While the shot serves, diegetically to 
indicate that Ripley is being returned to earth, it 
metonymical1y imputes her as representative of all 
earthlings and metaphorically links her with the maternal, 
ie. mother earth. The shot also functions to locate the 
spectator's gaze within the film—the spectator is out in 
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space—and focuses it along lines of force that draw it to 
secondary cinematic identificat ion with Ripley—the 
spectator is looking in on Ripley/earth, identifying with 
earth as home and thus with Ripley, its metonymic 
desi gnat e. 
But, in order for identification with Ripley to 
function, the promise of the cure and the reassurances of 
the phallic signifier must be brought into play. And in 
order for there to be a cure, there must be an illness. 
Ripley is elaborated as being hysteric due to a fear of 
and lack of motherhood. She has regular psych—evaluations 
and continues to have nightmares which feature the alien 
as a figure for fear of motherhood. The spectator is 
shown, immediately after the lap-dissolve, one of Ripley's 
nightmares in which she begins the convulsions of 
host-mother labor and the alien baby's head deforms her 
stomach, but does not emerge through the skin. 
In the corporate boardroom scene, Ripley's 
outstanding performance as an ordinary woman defeating the 
perfect organism is not only reviewed as exhorbitant 1y 
expensive—"42 million in adjusted dollars. That's minus 
payload, of course," quotes one exec—but is treated as a 
sort of hysterical hallucination; Ripley has "...found 
something never once recorded in over 300 surveyed 
worlds," another exec reprimands. The punitive powers of 
the Law place Ripley in the function of the child, the 
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goal of the spectator since all secondary cinematic 
identification involves regression to a sort of mirror 
stage meconnaissance. And this reconnaissance is 
encouraged by the fact that Ripley is already invested, 
through her symptom, as a site of the maternal. The scene 
initiates the identification, but it also inscribes the 
Phallic signifier in a relationship with Ripley, an 
investment in her which will be expanded as the film 
unrolls. Mirror stage misrecognition will be reiterated at 
several points throughout the film, each presenting a 
stronger investment of the phallic signifier, most notably 
when Ripley puts on her loader, a hydraulic enhancement of 
the human body, prosthetic godhood. 
The promise of the cure is tied in when the Company 
loses contact with a colony on the planet where Ripley 
first encountered the alien. Burke, a company rep, 
presents the rescue mission as not only Ripley's sole 
means of regaining status as desirable object in the eyes 
of the Father (the Company will pick up her contract as a 
flight officer), but also as the sole cure for her 
hysteria—a face—off with her fears of maternity bound up 
in the alien. The phallic signifier in this scene is 
localized in the presence of the military; Burke visits 
Ripley accompanied by Lieutenant Gorman, who assures her 
that the military has state-of-the-art fire-power and 
training, everything she and the spectator will need to 
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defeat the alien. As Lacan says, "Demand constitutes the 
Other as already possessing the 'privilege' of satisfying 
needs, that is to say, the power of depriving them of that 
alone by which they are satisfied" (Lacan, 286). Thus the 
military becomes the Other through which Ripley will 
access the phallus. "The fact that the phallus is a 
signifier means that it is in the place of the Other that 
the subject has access to it. But since this signifier is 
only veiled, as ratio of the Other's desire, it is this 
desire of the Other as such that the subject must 
r ec ogn ize..." < 288). 
Ripley, by accepting the mission, recognizes the 
desire of the Other and commences her rebirth into 
motherhood and desire, which is "neither the appetite for 
satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference 
that results from the subtraction of the first from the 
second, the phenomenon of their splitting" (287). Ripley 
will be split between the appetite for satisfaction as 
configured in the alien, and the demand for love which 
will be focused around the figures of Corporal Hicks and 
the chi1d/survivor, Newt. Thus the rebirth imaged for the 
spectator when Ripley slides through a chute in the 
colonists' outpost, at the instigation of Hicks, to 
capture Newt, indicates the constitution of Ripley's 
desire, because only a moment before, the marines opened 
fire on Newt thinking she was an alien. 
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As knowledge and power are consolidated in the figure 
of Ripley, the progress of the cure is marked and 
identification is increased. It is Ripley who points out 
the hazards of firing "standard light-armor piercing 
rounds" just beneath the main reactor tower, and Ripley 
who rescues the marines after their commander, Gorman, 
suffers hysterical paralysis. By contrasting Ripley's 
response, especially after she has just relived her 
nightmare via the video transmissions sent to the mobile 
commandpost by the troops, with Gorman's hysteria, the 
film indicates that the promise is being effected, Ripley 
is being cured. This confirmation is reinforced by the 
fact that Ripley breaks down the distancing of the video 
transmissions, driving the command unit into the alien's 
nursery to rescue the marines. She aligns herself with the 
Name of the Father (symbolized as the military) to combat 
the desire of the m(0)ther (the alien). The video 
transmissions function differently in Cameron's film; 
rather than distancing the spectator by their difference, 
they are closely aligned with Ripley's gaze and serve to 
heighten the secondary identification. 
When Ripley returns to the nursery, it will mark the 
transformation to sinthone, identification with the 
symptom. The alien, in Cameron's cinema of cure, more 
closely resembles the primally repressed than a fetish. 
She is buried three levels beneath the breast-like 
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atmospheric processor, sort of what is at the heart of all 
women. Camera shots linger on the aliens, delineating the 
whole of their form, especially the mother alien. For 
Burke, the alien is a fetish, an access to the desire of 
the m(0)ther which denies castration by representing 
substantial monetary remuneration, and Burke, seen as 
considerably out of line by the rest of the group, is 
eventually consumed by his fetish. 
The rest of the characters view the alien as a sort 
of outbreak of fear, but a desirable fear; the alien gives 
them purpose. As Zizek so succintly states it, "the only 
alternative to the symptom is nothing: pure autism, a 
psychic suicide, surrender to the death drive even to the 
total destruction of the symbolic universe. That is why 
the final Lacanian definition of the end of the 
psychoanalytic process is identification with the symptom" 
(Zizek, 75, italics his.'). This is what Ripley accomplishes 
when she enters the nursery to save Newt, her symbolic 
daughter, and discovers the presence of the phallic mother 
symbolically reified in the film—the first shot the 
spectator gets of the alien mother is of a penile 
appendage laying eggs, the camera then tracks up her 
engorged abdomen, finally focusing on her projectile 
"inner" mouth which hisses. As Ripley squares off with 
this fantasy of repressed, pre—oedipal desire, the 
m(Q)ther with phallus, she communicates with it, cutting 
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loose a blast from her flame-thrower, then pointing it at 
the eggs and staring meaningfully at the alien mother. 
Suddenly, the alien has been humanized, brought closer. 
She and Ripley have something in common, motherhood. It is 
only when an egg opens, the implicit threat of death 
betraying the unmistakable deal they've struck in mutual 
respect of maternity, that Ripley opens fire on the 
nur ser y. 
Not only does this scene indicate to the spectator 
delivery on the promise of the cure, but it radically 
extends the investment of phallic signi fication in Ripley 
that has been implicit from the beginning. She was brought 
along on the mission to function as an advisor because she 
is the only one who knows. Her position as center of 
knowledge is reiterated throughout the film; Ripley not 
only rises above the hysteria of Gorman, but also that of 
private Hudson and Newt. Her communication with the alien 
signals language acquisition which can only be brought 
about through the phallic signifier, and it realizes the 
split evincing desire as the subtraction of the appetite 
for satisfaction, the alien, from the demand for love, 
Newt and Hicks. 
Ripley has but one more step to effect the completion 
of her cure, the repression of the phallic mother, the 
metaphoric move by which she will replace desire of the 
mother with assumption of the mother's place and desire of 
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the father. In the cinema of cure, the m(0)ther is 
repressed rather than jouissance foreclosed, and this is 
indicated in the diegesis as the spectator hears her 
screaming into the void. In the cinema of symptom, all one 
hears is the music of the sound track and the rushing of 
air. It is the M(D)ther who will be elided in the 
signifying chain and replaced with the phallus. 
Up until this point, the dominant movement has been 
internal, like the inward-probing movement of 
psychoanalysis. This is inscribed in the opening scene 
when Ripley's module is sucked into the salvage ship, 
referred to in her dream as "rescued by a deep salvage 
team." The marines go "in" to complete their mission, at 
one point Lieutenant Gorman says, "I'm coming in," Ripley 
dives into Newt's hiding place to catch her, drives the 
mobile commandpost into the nursery to save the marines, 
later takes the elevator down and enters the nursery to 
save Newt and the marines build barricades so the aliens 
won't get in, all of which serves to reify the 
psychoanalytic process, up until this point. 
But the final scene undoes this movement for the 
spectator, while completing Ripley's cure. It is overtly 
outward moving, but implicitly inward in terms of the 
diegetical machinery already elaborated. By putting on the 
loader, Ripley once again assumes the Name of the Father 
to help her repress the phallic mother and protect her own 
budding identification with the place of the mother 
through Newt. And Ripley is a truly awesome sight in her 
loader, yellow warning—1ight cycling round on top, as she 
growls, "Get away from her, you BITCH!" This is the pay 
off for the spectator; Ripley, after all this struggle, 
has finally achieved rebirth into the patriarchal order, 
melding with it to become the prosthetic goddess. Her 
figure, through the secondary identification, excites the 
spectator's primary narcissism in its reenactrnent of the 
mirror stage; Ripley and her loader are the al1-powerful, 
symbiotic child/mother fusion. What's more, the whole 
oceanic, hydraulic hybrid is blessed by the paternal 
signifier since the loader is also phallic, the tool of 
the stevedore and property of the military. 
But the loader must be jettisoned with the phallic 
mother to confirm Ripley's acceptance of her own 
castration; the phal 1 us is hers only through the Name of 
the Father. Lacan describes a "condition of 
complimentarity...produced by the establishment of the 
subject by the signifier" whose pol-es are, namely, that 
"the subject designates his being only by barring 
everything he signifies, as it appears in the fact that h 
wants to be loved for himself" and that "the living part 
of that being in the primally repressed finds its 
signifier by receiving the mark of the repression of the 
phallus (by virtue of which the unconscious is language)" 
(Lacan, 288). The prirnally repressed alien can only stand 
for one of the figures in the algebra of desire if it is 
marked by the repression of the phallic signifier, the 
loader. So it is implicitly through repression, an inward 
motion, that Ripley achieves the status of subject, ie. 
the cure of this cinema. And Ripley's success is marked by 
the hugs and kisses of Newt who, at last, calls her 
"Mommy." On the heels of this appellation, comes the 
android, Bishop's, reconfirmation. It seems that Bishop's 
only function in the whole film is to utter the words 
which will consign Ripley to the status of subject, as he 
says, "Not bad for a human." Ripley has eliminated her 
hysteria by identification with the mother as desire of 
the Other, and the spectator has "experienced" this shift 
along the chain of signification through identification 
with Ripley. 
But the outward movement of this final scene undoes 
the cure for him or her. When the mCO)ther is repressed by 
Ripley, she comes screaming out of the screen to the 
spectator, whose gaze, through the camera—work, has been 
suddenly shifted to the outside. Secondary cinematic 
identification with Ripley has been radically broken and 
the spectator is now in full possession of the repressed 
m(0)ther. The symptom has been placed squarely in the 
spectator's visual lap which is why the beddy-bye scene 
following it passes by as so much effluvia. The spectator 
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is shown that, yes, Ripley and Newt are A. Okay, but what 
of the spectator. He or she has inherited the symptom. In 
this case, the cinema of cure is, itself, hysterical, 
ejaculating the symptom onto the spectator's narcissistic 
gaz e. 
"Men Miracled Up and Cursory Contraptions": 
Reconstructing the Name—of-the—Father 
in Cameron's Terminator- and Terminator II 
In positing James Cameron's Terminator and Terminator 
II as cinema of symptom and cinema of cure, one leaves 
behind the field of hysteria and ventures into the domain 
of paranoia, and because this confuses the idea of a 
cinema of symptom and cinema of cure, a few prefatory 
remarks are in order. It is virtually impossible to speak 
of the two films separately; they both elaborate the 
symptom per se in their presentation of the persecutory 
delusion because the psychotic symptom represents an 
attempt at a cure. Freud, in his analysis of 
Senatsprasident Schreber's autobiographical account, 
remarks, "The del as ion — format ion, uhich ue take to be a 
pathological product, i*- in reality an attempt at 
recovery, a process of reconstruction" (Freud, Vol. Ill, 
457, in italics in the original). In this way the 
narrative of these films, as with Schreber's narrative, 
becomes a sort of archaeology as reading, dedicated to 
uncovering absence and constructing explanatory structures 
for that which has been (or always already was) alienated. 
The modes of symptom and cure through which the 
subject/spectator enacts denial regarding the film's 
material reality by taking diegetically outlined 
positions and subsequently reinvesting in the "certitude" 
of the filmic signifier does not work in the Terminator 
films. These films articulate themselves as subject 
supposed to know simultaneously fractal, symptomatic: a 
position which bars the spectator from diegetical 
inscription as either subject supposed to know or through 
processes of secondary cinematic identification. 
It would seem that the spectator is to assume the 
position of the archaeologist in relation to the filmic 
signifier, and indeed both films inscribe a summons to 
decipher near the commencement of the narrative. In 
Terminator, following a brief clip from the battle of the 
future and the opening credits Cin that order), the 
immanent appearance of the terminator is presaged by the 
mechanical failure of a garbage truck and an electrical 
disturbance to which the garbageman responds by repeating 
the phrase, "What the hell'?" But the repetition of this 
vacuous phrase indicates a lack of intent toward an 
answer—this phrase, given an intention toward an answer, 
would be completed as "What the hell is it'?" Furthermore, 
the spectator is not inscribed in the diegesis as subject 
supposed to know, for the garbageman deserts the scene, 
1 ess interested in an answer than in avoiding the answer. 
In Tera inator //, the summons to interpret occurs after 
scenarios of the future, and the only human called upon t 
3 4  
investigate the mani testation of the terminator, a 
policeman who radios in that he is checking an electrical 
disturbance, is promptly disposed of by the TIOOO, who 
then assumes the policeman's identity. Both incidents 
serve to intimate to the spectator that investigation 
would be a hazardous proposition and that the position of 
subject supposed to know lies elsewhere in the diegesis. 
As a matter of fact, the summons to decipher keeps 
recurring throughout both films—Sarah Connor demands of 
Kyle Reese, "Why me?" And the cops, much to their 
detriment, keep investigating. Even psychological analysis 
is summoned to provide answers which are then proved false 
in both films. In Term inator, the criminal psychologist 
interprets Reese's behavior as psychotic and explains this 
to Sarah, but he is proven wrong when the terminator 
arrives at the police station. It is interesting to note 
here that the proof misses the psychologist who, on his 
way out the door as the terminator enters, drops his keys, 
bends to retrieve them and thus never even sees the 
terminator. The verification of Kyle's history addresses 
only the spectator. In Terminator II, the psychiatrist, 
played by the same actor who played the psychologist in 
the first movie, receives a dramatic rebuttal to his 
diagnosis of Sarah Connor as suffering from 
"Schizo-affective disorder" when the T—lOOO walks through 
the bars of the sanatorium's security doors. And his 
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response — .jaw gaping, cigarette let drop to the 
floor—encourages the spectator to ridicule any narrative 
position of informed subject. 
Instead, the spectator is given an extra—diegetical 
subject supposed to know. The 'I' who ennunciates these 
films, John Connor, marks the absence of any subject 
position in the diegesis as well as giving the lie to any 
illusions of a subject supposed to know. It is the John 
Connor of the future who plays puppetmaster to all the 
diegetical positions, the John Connor of the future who 
"knows" but must "not know" what function all these 
ciphers cum characters perform and how it all adds up. 
Even when the spectator is given a juvenile John Connor 
with whom to identify in Terminator //, it is still John 
Connor as he will become who holds all the answers—a 
position outside the narrative of the film which is 
further fragmented by the voice—overs in which Sarah 
Connor, John's mother, plays at being the voice of 
history. In "T II" the position of subject supposed to 
know to whom the symptom is addressed as a summons to 
decipher not only lies elsewhere, outside the film, but is 
split into masculine and feminine components—a split 
further evinced in Sarah's will to "change fate" by 
attempting to assassinate the man who will develop the 
technology necessary for the effectuation of SkyNet, 
persecutor par excellence. 
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In her article "Chi 1d/Alien/Father: Patriarchal 
Crisis and Generic Exchange," Vivian Sobchack points out 
the difficulties related to spectator identification with 
the characters of these films: 
Patriarchal re-solution is also harder won 
in The Terminator—not only because Reese's 
death in the narrative's present confounds the 
logic of the future from whence he comes, but 
also because paternity and patriarchal power are 
overtly split between two opposed alien figures 
with whom the spectator is encouraged to 
identify: Reese, the loving but vulnerable rebel 
from the future who will father his own eventual 
leader, and a cyborg assassin whose nearly 
invincible power and determination inspire more 
than reluctant admiration" (Sobchack, 2.6). 
In addition to resisting the forces of spectator 
identification, this splitting echoes the symptomatic 
withdrawal precursory to the development of the delusion 
(which I will discuss further on), and its function as 
representation of the disintegration precedent to delusion 
formation is further elaborated as a history, an 
archaeology in terms of the diegetical time frame. Freud 
remarks, "Paranoia decomposes just as hysteria condenses. 
Or rather, paranoia resolves once more into their elements 
the products of the condensations and identifications 
which are effected in the unconscious" (Freud, Vol. Ill, 
434) . 
Even Sarah Connor is split, just as configurations of 
the paternal are split. She begins the first movie as 
three names in a phonebook, and this split is carried 
through the diegesis by the figure of the police, who, 
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unlike the two future father—figures, are not interested 
in any one particular Sarah Connor so much as they are 
interested, as is the press, in the fate of the three 
Sarah Connors. The film invests a great deal of irony in 
this split; twice Sarah Connor is summoned to the 
television to hear of her namesakes' assassinations, 
namesakes who are a housewife/mother and a "professional" 
woman—the remaining Sarah Connor being a waitress. 
As in Scott's Alien, the spectator's identification 
with the characters in the film is frustrated by 
oscillations in the lines of power which also further 
elaborate this splitting and decomposition. In Terminator, 
the spectator is encouraged to identify with Sarah Connor 
as the focal point of all the action—the one for whom 
everyone, from terminator, to protector to cops, is 
looking. But Sarah suffers a loss of identity in this 
process, and only near the end of the film can she be seen 
to have any ability with which to counter the terminator, 
when she repeatedly drags or orders Kyle Reese to his feet 
and finally smashes the cyborg. 
Kyle is a much more powerful character, but defies 
identification in his brutality and obverse frailty; Reese 
is al ternat i vely seen as suffering ni ght rrtar es, nostalgia 
and wounds, or he brutally yanks Sarah through their 
escapes. When they hide out in the motel, Reese responds 
to Sarah's plaint, "So much pain." But he does so with an 
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inhuman dictum which gives insight into the faculties 
which allowed hi rn, previously, to grab her by the hair 
with more than necessary force and order her not to move: 
"Pain can be controlled; you just disconnect it." Then, in 
the same scene, he says, "I came across time for you, 
Sarah. I love you. 1 always have." Sarah and Kyle make 
love. They make John Connor. But first they make 
plastique. If Sarah is too powerless to be a stable point 
of identification for the spectator, Kyle Reese is just 
too mechanically obsessive. 
Then, of course, Arnold Schwartzenegger as the 
terminator, in his handsome invincibility and 
computer—generated command of every situation, 
successfully undermines his "black hat" position of being 
beyond empathy. The spectator wants to inhabit the TlOl's 
powerful and indestrue table body. 
And in Tereinstor IIT while the young John Connor is 
the focal point of the action, he is also a narcissistic 
juvenile delinquent, charming and repulsive by turns, 
often quite capable, but always in need of protection. 
Sarah Connor has become more mechanically obsessive, 
resembling by turns the terminator or the psychotic; she 
is strong, but inhumanly single—minded. Schwartzenegger as 
the T101 has lost his evil prime directive to become the 
goodlooking, invincible protector, but he is still, 
above-all, a machine. And the TIOOO, while his quicksilver 
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beauty and myt ho—magi cal powers arouse a deep aesthetic 
appr eciation, is more inhuman than the terminator of the 
first movie. Even as the cyborg terminator of the first 
movie, Schwartzenneger delivered those hallmark one—liners 
fraught with irony—in Term in a tor, where one would expect 
the T101 to be much more mechanical than in the later 
film, he responds to the flophouse super's, "Whatcha got 
in there, buddy, a dead cat?" by selecting "Fuck you, 
asshole" from a computer menu of plausible replies. In 
contrast, the TIOOO only says what it is absolutely 
necessary to say, and then only in the flatest of tones. 
While any one of these fragmentary positions provides 
enough prowess to attract the narcissistic Imaginary of 
the spectator, none of them emerges as an individual hero. 
Thus the spectator shifts from identification to 
identi fication. 
This lack of a single subjective position in the 
narrative is enhanced by the camera work which rarely 
takes up a subjective point of view in terms of the 
narrative, but operates almost solely through a sort of 
third—person omniscience which easily conflates with the 
enunciative position of the absent John Connor of the 
future. In this way the film conducts itself as subject 
supposed to know, reconstructing an identity for itself. 
The summons, then, is not so much to decipher as it 
is a summons to reconstruct necessitated by a process of 
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identification probiematized because the film is a 
delusion, the product of a withdrawal from the desire of 
the Other expressed in object cathexis, from all the stuff 
and dross of reality which ordinarily takes on meaning 
personal to the subject through its metonyrnous and 
metaphorical relations to those imagos which lie in the 
Imaginary but which remain separate from the 
subject—remain in the place of the Other—through the 
agency of the Symbolic. This withdrawal, in turn, gives 
rise to an alternative reality, the delusion, which tries 
to reconstitute the desire of the Other so that a position 
emerges for a desiring subject who makes no sacrifice to 
the Phallus. 
The spectator is left with another route into the 
film which Lacan seems to suggest in "On a Question 
Preliminary to any Possible Treatment of Psychosis" when 
he writes, 
Like Freud, I hold that we must listen to 
the speaker, when it is a question of a message 
that does not come from a subject beyond 
language, but from a speech beyond the subject. 
For only then will one hear that speech, which 
Schreber captured in the Other, when from 
Ahriman to Ormuz, from the evil God to the 
absent God, it brings the seed in which the very 
law of the signifier is articulated: ' filler 
Unsinn hebt sich auff 'All Nonsense is 
abolished!" (Ecrits, 214). 
At the beginning of Term inator, this message "from a 
speech beyond the subject" appears, seemingly from 
nowhere. After the sequence denoting the war of the future 
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between the evil SkyNet and the absent John Connor, stark 
white script scrolls onto the screen and promises that all 
Nonsense will be abolished. Beyond any identification, 
beyond any faith, the spectator must apprehend the film as 
a certitude because— 
The machines rose from the 
ashes of the nuclear fire. 
Their war to exterminate 
mankind had raged for 
decades, but the final 
battle would not be fought 
in the future. It would be 
fought here, 
in our present. 
Tonight..." 
Because it is the paranoiac's delusion, the battle for 
cohesion in the face of an unacceptable threat which calls 
the very act of signification into question, the delusion 
must be, must exist as certainty. Hence the insistence of 
the word "Tonight..." which, on the screen, is set apart 
on a line of its own. "Tonight..." not only insists by 
repeating the idea "our present" but also creates an 
opening from screen to spectator in the ellipsis following 
the word. The spectator is left to finish the sentence 
with the images of the film. This sort of inscription also 
occurs at the beginning of Term inat-or- II through the 
disembodied voice of Sarah Connor functioning in a tone 
and register reserved for the most sacred or sanctimonious 
histories, calling the spectator once again to behold the 
play of the signifier. The spectator assumes the certitude 
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of the film, like the psychotic, because he or she must, 
because ca parle <it speaks). As Lacan says, chastising 
the general bent of psychology to question whether or not 
the psychotic "believes" in his delusion, 
"La realite n'est pas ce qui est en cause. Le 
sujet- admet, par to us les detours ex pi i cat if s 
verbalement deve1oppes qui sont a sa porteer que 
ces phenomemes sont d'un autre order que le 
reelr il sait bien que leur realite n'est pas 
assureef il en admet meme jusqu'a un certain 
point I'irrealite. Mais, contrairement au sujet 
normal pour qui la realite vient dans son 
assiette, il a une certitude, qui est que ce 
dont il s'agit-—de 1' hal 1 uc inat ion a 
1f interpretation—le concern " 
("Reality is not what is in question. The 
subject admits, through all the verbally 
developed explicative detours within his reach, 
that these phenomena are of another order than 
the real; he knows well that their reality is 
not assured, he even admits, up to a certain 
point, their irreality. But, contrary to the 
normal subject for whom reality comes up in his 
plate, he has a certitude which is, for him, his 
concern—from the hal1ucination to the 
interpretation" <Sem inaire Illi Les Psychoses, 
87—88: trans, mine.) 
Thus the denial of the film's material reality and 
reinvestment in the reality of the filmic signifier 
operates through both the summons to decipher and the 
process of identification as they were previously 
discussed in relation to Alien and Aliens, but in 
Terminator and Terminator II the filmic state operates in 
such a way as to mimic the formation of paranoid delusion. 
In other words, the spectator, in order to achieve a 
subjective position within the film, must identify the 
position of the desiring subject in a world in which the 
4 3  
characters function more strictly as ciphers or markers 
than they ordinarily do in a fiction. In any fiction, 
characters will function as metaphors for the ideals 
underlying the narrative progress—as objects petit a 
invested with all the condensations of imaginary meanings 
which the narrative voice (and the reader) invests in 
them. The function of characters in a narrative which 
structures itself as a paranoid delusion lies in their 
metonymic destablization. In explaining metonymic 
destabi1ization it is first necessary to outline a few 
characteristics of psychosis as Lacan delineates them in 
"On a Quest i on Preliminary to any Possible Treatment of 
Psychosi s": 
For the psychosis to be triggered off, the 
Name—of—the-Father, veruorfe»f foreclosed, that 
is to say never having attained the place of the 
Other, must be called into symbolic opposition 
to the subject. 
It is the lack of the Name—of—the—Father in 
that place which, by the hole that it opens up 
in the signified, sets off the cascade of 
reshapings of the signifier from which the 
increasing disaster of the imaginary proceeds, 
to the point at which the level is reached at 
which the signifier and signified are stabilized 
in the delusional metaphor" CEcrits, 217). 
That this slippage in the field of the signifier results 
from the lack of the Name—of-the-Father in the place of 
the Other can be better understood when one considers that 
the Name—of-the—Father is the symbolic referent which 
effects the paints de capiton, the pinning of signifiers 
to meaning. As Anthony Wilden writes in The Language of 
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the Self, 
"Perhaps language is in fact totally tautologous 
in the sense that it can only in the end talk 
about itself, but in any event, Lacan has 
suggested that there must be some privileged 
'anchoring points' (the paints cfe capiton), 
points like the buttons on a mattress or the 
intersections in quilting, where there is a 
'pinning down' (.cap i tonnage) of meaning, not to 
an object, but rather by 'reference back' to a 
symbolic function. The tautologous, 'unanchored' 
glissement [sliding] of the signifier over the 
signified is in fact an aspect of certain types 
of [psychotic] language, where the 
correspondence of the subject's language to the 
'reality' accepted in normal discourse has 
somehow become unhinged, so that one may 
discover the [psychotic] at the mercy of binary 
semantic oppositions structurally similar to the 
child's first semantic or phonemic acts, but in 
which the opposition is valued over the content" 
(Mi 1den, 273). 
Lacan will articulate these binary semantic oppositions as 
the positional register of language, metonorny, in 
Seninaire III: Les Ps ychoses: 
C'est le coeur tie la pensee freudienne. Lf oeuvre 
commence par le reve, ses mecanismes de 
condensation et deplacements, de figuration, ils 
sont tous de l'ordre de lf articulation 
metonymique, et c'est sur ce fondement- que la 
metaphore peut intervener,ST il y a un ordre 
d'acquisition, ce n'est certainement pas celui 
qui permettrait de dire que les enfants 
commencent par tel element du stock verbal 
plutot que par tel autre. II y a plus grande 
diversite. On n'attrape pas le langage par un 
bout, comme certains peintres commencent leurs 
tableaux par le cote gauche. Le langage, pour 
naitre, doit toujours etre deja pris dans son 
ensemble. Par contre, pour qu*il puisse etre 
pris dans son ensemble, il faut quf il commence 
par etre pris par le bout du signifiant" (Sem. 
Ill, 259-260.->. 
(It is the heart of Freudian thought. The work 
commences with the dream, the mechanisms of 
condensation, displacement and figuration, all 
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of which are of the order of metonymic 
articulation, and it is on this foundation that 
the metaphor can intervene...If there is an 
order of acquisition, it certainly is not that 
one which permits it to be said that infants 
commence by this element of the verbal stock 
rather than another. There is the utmost 
diversity. One cannot grasp language by one end, 
as certain painters commence their paintings 
from the left side. Language, in order to be 
born, must always be already taken in its 
entirety. On the other hand, for it to be taken 
in its entirety, it must begin by being taken by 
the end of the signifier" Trans, mine.) 
The characters of Tera inator and T era inciter- II function as 
ciphers, pi ace—markers for what cannot be signified, which 
have been introjected into the diegesis on the basis of 
their contiguous relation to what is not present (John 
Connor as Name—of-the-Father). El lie Ragland—Sul1ivan 
explains this process in Jacques Lacan and the Philosophy 
of Psychoanalysis: 
If imaginary images function like Symbolic order 
words, it is clear that words need not be 
separate from things, and we can begin to 
comprehend the functional principles behind 
dreams, poetry, and psychotic language. By 
ascribing a homogeneous—Imaginary—structure to 
symptoms, dreams, memory lapses, jokes, parole, 
signifieds, and the rest, Lacan surmised that 
the merger function between words and objects 
(or things and people)—based on associational 
similarities—ultimately refers to unknown 
signi fiers present in the Other<A). Imaginary 
truth, in other words, only takes on its "sense" 
i sens') in relation to the repressed language in 
the Other(A), whose oppositional mode of 
thinking is neither rational nor grammatical but 
Desiring and intentional" (Phil, of Psych., 
239) -
The juvenile John Connor, Sarah Connor, Kyle Reese and the 
Terminator pose problems for the spectator wishing to 
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enter the film by identifying with them because they 
circulate like so much flotsam and jetsam indicating what 
is no longer (or, in this case, what is not yet): John 
Connor. In other words, spectator identification slips 
because the characters function as signifiers that, 
consequent to the absence of the Name—of—the—Father, enter 
into a metonymic play in which, as Ragland-Sul1ivan 
wr .i t es, 
"No signified, no principle of unity and 
self—meaning, could appear in language, then, 
but only the grandious ideal ego: the unnamed, 
uncastrated enfant nerve i11eux who is "spoken" 
by the disembodied signifiers inhabiting the 
Other(A>. The signifiers that now "speak" the 
psychotic Je (voi individuality having 
disappeared) would normally be inaccessible to 
conscious life" C250). 
This also addresses the elements of megalomania so 
prominent in Terminator and Terminator II. If the T101, 
TIOOO and SkyNet provide the films with nearly invincible 
persecutors, how much more grand, uncastrated and 
marvelous must John Connor appear. John Connor, the 
psychotic Je which is "spoken" as sole concern of all the 
characters in these films, elaborates himself as the 
savior of humanity through his manipulations of all but 
SkyNet. As Freud writes of megalofoania, 
"...in paranoia the liberated libido becomes 
fixed on to the ego, and is used for the 
aggrandizement of the ego. A return is thus made 
to the stage of narcissism...in which a person's 
only sexual object is his own ego..-and we can 
assert that the amount of regress ion 
characteristic of paranoia is indicated by the 
length of the step back from subliaated 
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homosexuality to narcissism" (Freud, Vol- III, 
459; italics in the original). 
For every terminator SkyNet sends back, John Connor sends 
a counter-agent; he rewrites the primal scene by sending 
back his father (both Kyle Reese and the TlOl of 
Terminator //), certain of both their patrimony and their 
death, which would constitute a rather large step back 
from homosexual attachment to the father and into 
narcissism by its very nature of being a supreme act of 
radical mastery. 
John Connor rests secure and inaccessible in the 
future to manifest himself, first, as the unborn and 
unnamed (because he sent back Kyle Reese who tells Sarah 
her son is named John, John Connor can be seen as naming 
himself), then as the narcissistic "enfant merveilleux" of 
Terminator //, a precocious juvenile delinquent who knows 
how to break into computers, fend for himself, and 
instruct his surrogate father, the TlOl, on the mores of 
being human. 
Freud, writing of Schreber, delineates the structure 
of megalomania which could serve perfectly as a plot 
summary for the two films: 
The process may stop at the stage of a partial 
detachment or it may spread to a general one, 
which will loudly proclaim its presence by means 
of the symptoms of megalomania. Thus...the 
detachment of the libido from the figure of 
Flechsig may have been the primary process in 
the case of Schreber; it was immediately 
followed by the appearance of the delusion, 
which brought back the libido on to Flechsig 
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again (though with a negative sign to mark the 
fact that repression had taken place) and thus 
annulled the work of repression. And now the 
battle of repression broke out anew, but this 
time with more powerful weapons....ti11 at 
length a victory for the forces of repression 
could find expression in a conviction that the 
world had come to an end and that the self alone 
survived" (Vol. Ill, 460) 
If the self alone survives, the signifiers who speak 
it, those "miracled up men and cursory contraptions" (455) 
of Terminator and Term inator II engage metonymic play on a 
number of levels. The editing continually expresses this 
sort of contiguity. In Terminator //, Sarah, trying to 
convince the psychiatrist that she is sane enough for a 
visit from her son, asks him why the company would 
cover—up the fact that they found terminator remnants. Her 
question is followed i mmed i at €*1 y by a .jump cut to the 
company and Dyson retrieving these very remains from a 
high security vault. Even in Terminatorf which plays much 
less in the metonymic register, several jump cuts shift 
from a focused shot on a hunter—ki11er machine of the 
future to a garbage truck or caterpiller tractor of the 
present. Here, the idea of contiguity should not be 
confused with that of similarity. The perfect machine of 
the future is linked to the fallible machine of the 
present through the level of syntactic function (the level 
of the signifier) rather than through any denotative or 
connotative characteristics (level of the signified). The 
connotations of these jump—cuts not only lie outside the 
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significative contiguity—machine—but run counter to any 
sirnilarity; as Constance Penley states in "Time Travel, 
Primal Scene and the Critical Dystopia," "...tech turns 
noir because of human decision-making and not something 
inherent in technology itself..." (Penley, 69). The two 
machines do not mean the same the thing; they only share 
the same syntactical slot in the grammar of the film. And 
another sort of metonymy, that of synecdochy (substitution 
of the part for the whole), also finds expression in 
Terminator- When the first Sarah Connor listed in the 
phonebook gets her death by metonymy, the camera focuses 
on the red dot of the laser sighting on her forehead, then 
cuts to the terminator's hand firing the gun. 
Dialogue in Term inator II, also takes on metonymic 
characteristics. As Lacan says, "Mais quand Schreber 
entend Factum est, et que ca s'arrete, il y a certainement 
la un phenomene qui se manifest au niveau des relations de 
contiguite. Les relations de contiguite dominent, a la 
suite de 1'absence ou de la defaillanace de la fonction 
d'equivalence significative par voie de similarite." ("But 
when Schreber hears "Factum est," and that it stops, there 
is certainly a phenomena which manifests itself at the 
level of the relations of contiguity. The relations of 
contiguity dominate, following the absence or the-
weakening of the function of significative equivalence 
through the path of similarity" Sem. Ill, 249. Trans. 
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mine). He adds a bit further on, in discussing the effect 
of interrupted speech, "Ce qui srimpose au sujet est la 
partie grammatique de la phrase, celle qui n'exist que par 
son caractere signi fiant et par son articulation" ("That 
which imposes, itself on the subject is the grammatical 
part of the phrase, that which only exists through its 
signifying character and its articulation" ibid. Trans, 
mine). What he is pointing to is speech emptied of its 
meaning: "Viola un personage qui est la a se servir 
d ' i mrnenses bla—bla—bla extraordinairement articules, 
quelquefois riches d'inflexions, mais qui ne peut jamais 
arriver au coeur de ce qu'il a a communiquer" ("Here is a 
person who is there at the service of immense babblings 
extraordinari1y well articulated, sometimes rich in 
inflections, but who can never arrive at the heart of what 
he has to communicate" Ibid. 250. Trans, mine). In 
Terr-m inator IIf John Connor riddles the general dialogue 
with cliched, empty catch phrases. Confronted with the 
truth of the TlOl, after believing that his Morn was a 
lunatic, he says, "Get a grip, John." After the TlOl tells 
him self—destruction is in human nature, he says, "Major 
drag, Huh'?" And he gives a lesson to the TlOl, who always 
speaks meaningfully even if it is rather clipped, on how 
to speak more like a human, instructing him to say "No 
Problemo" instead of "Affirmative" along with a whole 
string of such all-purpose cliches. 
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More specifically as it relates to the function of 
the characters, metonomy slides across the surface of 
Terminator- II in relation to the use of sunglasses. The 
spectator first sees sunglasses in the first film when the 
terminator puts thern on to cover the aftermath of a 
radical optical surgery. Here the sunglasses function in a 
way reminiscent of those years past when mirrored 
sunglasses meant hiding the visible effects of an "altered 
state" due to drug use. And the idea of sunglasses begins 
to empty of its meaning further when the terminator sports 
them at night. But in Terminator- only the terminator wears 
sunglasses; in Terminator II sunglasses start to slip from 
face to face. The sunglasses start out in the pocket of an 
old hippie who tries to stop the TlOl from taking another 
hippie's bike. The TlOl intimidates them out of the 
hippie's pocket and puts them on while the sound track 
plays George Thoroughgood's "Bad to the Bone," all of 
which has the effect of humorously recalling the first 
movie in which the TlOl indeed embodied the idea of being 
"bad to the bone," in spite of the fact, or perhaps 
because of the fact, that his "bones" were chrome. The 
sunglasses remain on the TlOl's face until they are 
knocked askew in a tussle at the Pescadero Mental Hospital 
while he and John Connor liberate Sarah. This occurs after 
John has instructed the TlOl that he cannot just kill 
people. Thus the TlOl commences the project of 
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humanization , and the sunglasses disappear for a brief 
period only to reappear on the face of the TIOOO when he 
encounters a California Highway Patrolman and commandeers 
his motorcycle as well as his face and form. The sleek, 
CHiP helmet and mirrored eyewear metonymously echo the 
TlOOO's alchemical prowess and imbue him with the 
attributes of being the only 'real,' evil, mechanical man 
left in the film. But the sunglasses don't stop here. They 
next appear on the face of Sarah Connor as she sets out to 
assassinate Dyson, the man responsible for the technology 
which will enable the eventual production of SkyNet. By 
now, because the sunglasses have been emptied of any 
function other than referentiality, their only 
signification is positional, assoc i at i ng Sarah with the 
termi nators. 
But the metonymic play can best be seen in Terminator 
II in the figure of the TIOOO. A large part of the TlOOO's 
aesthetical appeal, as well as its terrifying power, rests 
on its metonymic ability to assume the shape and 
appearance of anything it "touches," provided it is of the 
same mass. Made of "mimetic poly—al1oy," the TIOOO can 
turn itself into the floor of the Pescadero Mental 
Hospital (metonymy on metonymy—the spectator is shown 
several jump cuts between the guard's coffee filling his 
cup and the liquid man rising out of the floor) or John 
Connor's foster—mother. It stands in the place of "IT" as 
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ungendered shifter and mass noun par excellence. It 
defines the perfect ''disembodied signifier inhabiting the 
Other(A)-" The TIOOO operates as complete lack of identity 
save that given it by the teleology which relates it to 
what is not there—the John Connor of the future. It is 
pure function and referentiality. The spectator sees the 
TIOOO assume the forms of several police figures thus 
imputing to the cops a persecutory identity, even though, 
on the level of the signi fied, these police figures serve 
as prey and disguise for the TIOOO. And its antagonism 
toward the TlOl makes him seem all the more human by 
comparison. Its absolute emptiness redefines everything it 
comes into contact with; it empties everything and 
everyone of any alternative connotation and gives them a 
meaning that is strictly binary and oppositional. What 
more could be desired of metonymy? 
It should come as no surprise, then, that we find the 
TIOOO at another nexus in the elaboration of the psychotic 
delusion. For Lacan, desire is a metonomy, a metonomy 
constructed of metaphors. If man's desire is the desire of 
the Other, then the subject is caught in a continuous 
slide of substitutions which will always fail to fulfill 
the parameters of this desire as it is constituted outside 
of "self" and comprised of more than the subject will be 
able to locate in his or her substitutions. As 
Ragland—Sul1ivan says, 
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Lacan insists that self has an anticipatory 
value that it seeks to reaffirm in Real 
situations through the recognition of others 
Cego ideals meant to reify an ideal ego) and, in 
so doing, reaffirm its worth retroactively. But 
Desire prevents this drama of anticipation and 
retroaction from being harmonious. Since the 
Real objects of Desire (objet a) always refer to 
yet another Desire—both backward to primordial 
objects and forward in the anticipation of an 
impossible, final fulfillment—the objects 
themselves as well as the absent signifiers in 
the Other (A) , place the j»o i in an unstable 
metonymic chain of Desire" <Phil. of Psych., 
244-245). 
The metaphoric substitution of objets a for those 
primordial objects, which have become signifiers in the 
Other, place the subject in a metonymic slide, as no set 
of objets a will be seen to merge completely with the set 
of signifiers in the Other. Thus, the subject, having 
attached a libidinal "meaning" to one or more objects, 
will always be in the position of being contiguous to the 
remaining, unsignified signifiers in the set comprising 
the desire of the Other. One sees here how it is 
inevitable for the psychotic to eventually "bump into" the 
empty hole left in the Other by the missing 
Name—of—the-Father; at which point, ineluctably, the 
signifying chain is going to breakdown, for what is 
missing as signifier in the Other cannot possibly be 
signified through the metsiphoric substitutions of objets 
a. In this way, the TIOOO becomes the volatile 
reconstruction of a signifier (a signifier which could not 
possibly be found amongst the objets a of the subject's 
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original libidinal connection to the 'real' world) built 
out of the fragments, (signifiers) in the Other over the 
place where there is no signifier. The TIOOO is as 
amorphous as the void it intends to recuperate and as 
threatening as the retroactively immanent breakdown which 
destabilized the signifying chain on which depends the 
constitution of the 'self' as desiring subject. 
But it must not be forgotten that psychosis also 
decomposes the condensations and identifications effected 
in the unconscious. Through the TIOOO, SkyNet is 
signified. SkyNet will go online on August 8th, 1997, 
according to the TlOl, who says, "Human decisions are 
removed from Strategic Defence. SkyNet begins to learn at 
a geometric rate. It becomes self-aware at 2:14 a.m. on 
August 29th, 1997." SkyNet, according to Reese in the 
first film, "decided our fate in a 
micro—second—extermination," echoing the enigmatic 
statement Lacan makes near the end of "On a Question 
Preliminary to any Possible Treatment of Psychosis": "The 
term, in which the process by which the signifier has 
'unleashed' itself in the real culminates, after the 
failure of the Name—of-the-Father was opened up—that is 
to say, the failure of the signifier in the Other, as 
locus of the signifier, is the signifier of the Other as 
locus of the law" (Ecrits, 221). The endless dechaining of 
the signifier evident in these lines, as it is in the 
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endless referentiality of the TIOOO in the film, can only 
be stabilized by signifying the Other (SkyNet) as locus of 
the law. 
SkyNet is "hooked into everything," a vast network of 
fiber optics and telecommunications satellites, and 
provides the film with a persecutor whose composite 
elements compare to the filaments and rays of Schreber's 
"God"—a persecutor who, like Schreber's "God", is 
ignorant of human nature (although a great deal of 
possible human responses are programmed into the TlOl and 
TIOOO, they remain ignorant of such human nature as tears, 
jokes and the unremitting will to survive) and is divided 
up into different personas. In these endless divisions of 
the persecutor figure, the "cascade of reshapings" and 
"increasing disaster of the imaginary" (op. cit.) dance 
around the rim of that which cannot be signified. SkyNet 
always remains exterior to the film, in its future, as the 
site of anticipated fulfillment while its absence is 
articulated retrospectively. And one must include in these 
dividings up the figure of the TlOl. 
As the first elaborated and primary terminator, the 
TlOl lies closest to that signifier which "bumped into" 
the void in the Other which set off the whole chain of 
reconstruction. This signifier, Freud posited, is the 
homoerotic wish which is part of every psychotic symptom. 
As Freud writes, "The view had already been put forward in 
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psycho—analytic literature that patients suffering from 
paranoia are struggling against an intensification of 
their homosexual trends, this pointing back to a 
narcissistic object—choice. And a further interpretation 
had been made: that the persecutor is in reality the loved 
person, past or present" (Freud, Vol. II, 152—153). In 
terms of the two films, homoeroticism should be read as 
homo&r ot i c i srn , the erotics of andr oc ent r i sm as enacted on 
the body as machine and the machine as body. Mark Dery, in 
his ""Guerrilla Semiotics," sums up this conundrum: 
"Schwarzenegger, a hunky Mensahnaehine best 
known for his portrayal of a death-dealing 
cyborg, epitomizes sexual confusion in the 
technotronic age. When he confesses, in the 
BBC's five—part teardown of Tinseltown, Naked 
Hollyuaodf that 'pumping iron is just like 
having sex,' he speaks for many. 'Can you 
believe how much I am in heaven?,' he effuses. 
'I am, like; aoning day and night.' His 
experience is hardly unique. Few who have sat in 
a state—of-the—art health club, surrounded by 
mirrors and straddling a gleaming Cybex 
apparatus, its moving parts slick with 
lubricant, would deny that the overall 
impression is one of automated intercourse. It 
is Philosophy in the Haati1 us Room—the Marquis 
de Sade meets Jack LaLanne" (Dery, 43). 
In this respect, it is not surprising to find the TlOl 
(read Arnold Schwarzenegger) as the privileged site for 
eroticism. Only the TlOl comes through time posed like 
Greek statuary, body—builder muscles gleaming showily. 
Kyle Reese comes through time in a decidedly unerotic 
fetal position, and when he arrives in the present he 
squeals and gasps with pain in a most unaesthetical 
fashion. The only evidence the spectator gets of the 
TlOOO's travel through tirnef on the other hand, is a 
gaping hole in the chainlink fence: a figure that will be 
echoed when its final scream forms a chrome vagina of its 
throat which is not unerotic, but comes to the spectator 
laden with implications of death. The TIOOO is presented 
as naked upon arrival, but the image of nudity succumbs t 
the image of the murder of the policeman—the primordial 
murder of the father which brings us back to the hole in 
the fence as the void in the Other where the 
Name—of-the—Father should be. It is immediately followed 
by the TlOOO's assuming the shape of a clothed policeman. 
While the TlOl is invested with fully potent 
hovosexuality, the TIOOO gives life to all its ambiguity, 
its emptiness and its relation to death. Donna Haraway, 
whose "A Manifesto for Cyborgs" deals explicitly with the 
problematics of post—modern identification while positing 
the cyborg as a potent subversive position for the 
socialist feminist, elaborates cyborg sexuality thus: 
"Modern medicine is also full of cyborgs, of 
couplings between organism and machine, each 
conceived as coded devices, in an intimacy and 
with a power that was not generated in the 
history of sexuality. Cyborg 'sex' restores some 
of the lovely replicative baroque of ferns and 
invertebrates (such nice organic prophylactics 
against heterosexism). Cyborg replication is 
uncoupled from organic reproduction" (Haraway, 
6 6 ) .  
Wouoer ot i c i srn functions as the sterile barrier to 
homoeroticisrfi, but it still preoccupies itself with the 
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irnago of the father. Though it is Kyle Reese who figures 
as father in the primal scene of the first film (cf. 
Penley), it will be the TlOl who Sarah invests as perfect 
father. As the TlOl plays with her son John, Sarah says in 
a historically-toned voice-over, "Of all the would be 
fathers who came and went over the years, this thing, this 
machine was the only one who measured up. In an insane 
world, it was the sanest choice." And this perhaps 
reflects the fact that, as a signifier for what cannot be 
signified, Kyle Reese presents a very ambiguous figure 
linked through the cause of his presence to both the John 
Connor of the future and the terrifying Law of the Father 
that is SkyNet. Reese functions more as a mere link in the 
signifying chain than as a focal point for eroticism. 
Even the figure of Sarah Connor becomes more 
mechanical and masculine. She is linked metonymical1y to 
the TlOl through the sunglasses, as previously discussed, 
and she localizes the concept of body as machine by 
working out in her hospital cell, cleverly up—ending her 
bed to gain a chin—up bar (one wonders if she also 
bench—presses with it). She becomes, in the second film, a 
hardened killing machine with gleaming muscles, especially 
in those scenes in which she batters down the hospital 
guards and when she prepares to assassinate Dyson. As her 
roommate, Ginger, says in Terminator when they make their 
Friday night toilette, "Better than mortal man deserves." 
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If ho»oeroticism in its context with psychosis and the 
films, functions as a sterile relay in the metonymic chain 
of desire, it remains to discuss the mechanics of this 
r el ay. 
Several references to the time frame, especially as 
it relates to the signifier, have been made in the course 
of this paper, and, of course, any discussion of the films 
could not avoid the "time-loop paradox" as it is commonly 
called. Constance Penley, in her analysis of Terminator 
posits the "time-loop paradox" as narcissistic wish 
fulfillment, citing the fact that the John Connor of the 
future, in effect, rewrites the primal scene disposing of 
the father "...in order to go off with (in) his mother" 
(Penley, 73). She further elaborates this as the key to 
the spectator's fascination with this sort of story, which 
has certainly proven to be good box office with such films 
as Back to the Future and sequels. Mhile it might be true 
that this really is the hook for the spectator, and on one 
level it seems to be a plausible reading of the first of 
the two films, it fails to take into account the 
homosexual preoccupation with the concept father as it is 
elaborated in the TlOl as icon of the paranoid persecution 
complex. And it completely fails the second film in which 
the mother is transformed into a masculinized machine. 
This failure can be attributed to the fact that the 
"time—loop paradox" of Terninator and Terninator II 
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functions most expressly at the level of the signifier in 
its appointed rounds, especially as they concern the 
paternal metaphor and the structure of delusion formation 
in psychosis. As Wilden has stated, 
...the point de capiton is defined in purely 
linguistic terms as that by which the signifier 
brings the indefinite glissement CslidingD to a 
stop. The diachronic function of the point de 
cspiton in the sentence, according to Lacan, is 
that function which describes the process of 
signification in speech. The signification of a 
sentence remains 'open' until its final term 
(including punctuation). Each term is 
anticipated by those which precede it in the 
construction of the sentence, and, inversely, 
the meaning of the sentence is retroactively 
revealed by a sort of reading backwards from the 
end" CUJilden, 274). 
This recalls the previously quoted discussion of desire as 
the drama of anticipation and retroaction by 
Ragland-Sul1ivan. It also recalls Freud's theory of 
delusion formation as being a "lordly" reconstitution of 
the decomposition of condensations and identifications in 
the unconscious. At any rate, if John Connor is 
"rewriting" the primal scene and family history, he is 
also rewriting the apocalypse and the homoerotic father. 
Furthermore, he rewrites under the onus of a threat of 
extermination, the source of which lies both in the past 
and future—SkyNet, the "new order of intelligence" and 
scaffold over the void in the Other. As was previously 
discussed regarding the function of the characters as 
signifiers, these films, more than performing as meagre 
wish fulfillment, reconstruct a subjectivity which has 
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been radically resolved into its component elements; the 
films function as John Connor reading backwards to the 
place where the paint de capitan has fallen into the 
Lacanian Real. 
Freud hints at this when he comments on Schreber: 
Ideas of this kind about a wor1d—catastrophe are 
not infrequently reported as occurring during 
the agitated stage in other cases of paranoia. 
If we take our stand upon the theory of 
libidinal cathexis, and if we follow the hint 
gi ven by Schreber's view of other people as 
being 'cursory contraptions', we shall not find 
it difficult to explain these catastrophes. The 
patient has withdrawn from the persons in his 
environment and from the external world 
generally the libidinal cathexis which he has 
hitherto directed on to them. Thus all things 
have become indifferent and irrelevant to him, 
and have to be explained by means of a secondary 
rationalization as being 'miracled up, cursory 
contraptions'" (Freud, Vol. Ill, 456) 
It is easy to see the relation between "miracled up men 
and cursory contraptions" and the terminators (certainly 
contrapt i oris) and Kyle Reese ("miracled" into the present 
from the future). It is also easy to understand the 
relation between the future as a locus and the future as a 
signifier for the—pi ace—of—that—which—cannot—be-signified . 
The secondary rationalization as it is elaborated by the 
film takes the form of reconnaissance, misrecognition. As 
Slavoj Zizek writes in The Subline Object of Ideology, 
...the subject is confronted with a scene from 
the past that he wants to change, to meddle 
with, to intervene in; he takes a journey into 
the past, intervenes in the scene, and it is not 
that he 'cannot change anything'—quite the 
contrary, only through his intervention does the 
scene from the past become uhat it alnays nasm, 
his intervention was from the beginning 
comprised, included. The initial 'illusion' of 
the subject consists in simply forgetting to 
include in the scene his own act—that is, to 
overlook how 'it counts, it is counted and the 
one who counts is already included in the 
account' (Lacan, 1379, p. 26). This introduces a 
relationship between truth and 
misrecognition/misapprehension by which the 
Truth, literally, arises from rni sr ecogni t i on " 
(Zizek, 57—58). 
At the literal level, this is exactly the framework 
structuring Terminator and Terminator II; if John Connor 
had not sent back Kyle Reese, he would not be who he 
becomes in the future, and it is the fragments of the 
first TlOl which provide Dyson with the keys to unlocking 
the technology necessary to build SkyNet. (It is 
interesting to note here that the TlOl has left yet 
another arm stuck ih the machinery of the present in 
Terminator II. With very little retroactive reading one 
can readily see the potential for a "Terminator III"). 
One of the most prominent examples of retroactive 
reading in the first film, which gets mentioned again in 
the second, can be found in the message that John Connor 
makes Kyle Reese memorize to give to his mother. Here it 
is the case that what is enunciated in the future can onl 
be read in the past. It should also be noted that the 
message changes somewhat when it is reiterated by the 
juvenile John Connor in the second film. Like the 
childhood game of "telephone," the message is distorted i 
its transmission from one to another of the characters. 
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The message from John Connor of the future which Kyle 
repeats to Sarah consists primarily of a thank—you for 
your courage in the dark times to come. But when the 
juvenile John Connor repeats it to the TlOl (after having 
heard it from his mother, one must surmise) it has become 
redolent with the power to change fate. The John Connor of 
the future who effects the speech act can only understand 
what he meant by it as the John Connor of the* past. 
But ateconnsiss&nce also plays at the diegetical level 
of the film. Perhaps the most notable example of 
misapprehension centers around the answering machines of 
both the L.A.P.D. and Sarah Connor. Troubled by the news 
broadcasts denoting the assassination of the other Sarah 
Connors, Sarah calls the police and is put on hold. The 
police, meanwhile are trying to contact Sarah and keep 
getting her answering machine. Sarah then phones home, but 
Ginger has already been killed, and the terminator takes 
the message. (In an ironic mode the terminator hears 
Ginger's preamble to the beep which says, "Ha! Ha! Ha! 
Fooled ya! You're talking to a machine. But that's Okay; 
machines need love, too! This is Ginger. Sarah and I can't 
come to the phone right now..." Thus the terminator 
discovers he has terminated the wrong girl. He also gets 
Sarah's location from her message)- This might all appear 
to be simply missed connections, until one remembers the 
very nature of an answering machine; the message on the 
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machine is always received retroactively as a speech act 
occurring in the past whose meaning can only be read in 
the future—whenever the tape is played—back. 
Another incident involving the telephone more clearly 
demonstrates back reading. Sarah calls her mother's cabin 
from the motel she and Kyle are holed up in and gives away 
the phone number to the motel. The spectator then 
discovers that it was the terminator on the other end of 
the line, mimicking Mom's voice—perfect meeannaissance 
for Sarah, perfect retroactive reading for the spectator. 
The TlOl must then call the number to find out Sarah's 
location—the message can only be read retroactively. And 
Sarah can only realize that her mother is dead after the 
terminator shows up at the motel—reading back again. 
The voice—overs in which Sarah speaks the history can 
be viewed in this respect also. Sarah speaks from outside 
the film, from the place of the Other, to tell the 
spectator about "Judgement Day," the war with the 
machines, the machine as the perfect father, and the 
uncharted territory of reshaping history. But these 
messages only take on meaning for the spectator at the end 
of the film when he or she has witnessed the war with the 
TIOOO, the deep bond between John and the TlOl which shows 
up as he is lowered into the molten metal and remembers 
the arm caught in the giant cog just as John Connor 
disposes of the arm and micro-chip from the Cyberdyne 
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labs. Only then does Sarah's history "mean." 
Truth as it emerges from misrecognition gets a 
pointed elaboration in Terminator- //, when young John 
Connor calls to warn his foster parents, but the TIOOO has 
already arrived on the scene and imitates Jenelle. John 
suspects something is wrong because Jenelle is never this 
nice and hands the phone to the TlOO, who notices a dog 
barking in the background and asks John what his dog is 
named. John replies, "Max." The TlOl, mimicking John's 
voice, asks the TIOOO, mimicking Jenelle's voice, if 
"Woofie" is alright. The TIOOO answers that "Woofie" is 
.just fine. The truth that they are speaking to the TIOOO 
only comes about because the TIOOO mistakes the dog's name 
given by the TlOl as true—it misrecognizes the dog. 
But perhaps the most evident images of retroactive 
reading come through the diegesis of both films in the 
slow—motion sequences. These occur several times, and each 
time it implicates an instance of misrecognition and 
retroactive reading. The first instance occurs when Sarah 
sees the news clip about the second Sarah Connor's murder. 
She walks to the payphone in slow—motion and all the men 
in the bar stare at her as i f she were not human but 
something absolutely unrecognizable. She drops her quarter 
and begins to dial, then notices a piece of paper attached 
to the phone. She must turn it over, read the back side, 
to discover that the phone is out of order. 
The next incident is even more pronounced. The 
terminator enters Tech Noir, a night club, and stalks 
between tables and dancers in slow—motion. Sarah drops her 
napkin and bends to fetch it just as the terminator looks 
her way. The terminator reaches the end of the bar and 
turns back. Voila, he spots Sarah, but only after he turns 
bac k. 
In Terminator II the same slow—motion formula is used 
when young John Connor is running from the TIOOO. He is in 
some bac kst age—of — the—rnal 1 maze of corridors and comes 
through the double doors only to see the TlOl coming at 
him in slow-motion, shedding the box of roses he used to 
conceal his shotgun. John mistakes the TlOl's intention, 
believing that he has come to gun him down. It is only 
when he looks over his shoulder to see the TIOOO rounding 
a corner that he understands and hits the floor. 
At the end of the film, though shot at regular speed, 
John will again have to "read backward" to determine which 
of the Sarah Connors is actually his mother (the other 
being the TIOOO). And, of course, it is the one behind 
him. But this scene also echoes an earlier scene in which 
John, after verifying the identity of the TlOl, comes to 
realize that his mother was not crazy—everything she said 
was true. This same sort of retroactive reading keeps the 
spectator indulging in the certitude of the filmic 
signifier. Again and again, especially in those scenes 
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concerning the mental health profession, any elaboration 
of the film as a delusion will finally turn up a point de 
cspiton which forces the spectator to "read back" and 
recover the narrative as truth. 
If it has been impossible to separate the two films 
as symptom and cure because they both present both 
paradigms, it is, nevertheless, possible to separate them 
at the structural level of expressing Freud's later 
expansion of the paradigm for psychosis; the first film, 
like the first stage of paranoid symptom formation, 
reveals a retraction of libidinal cathexis, and the second 
film, like the second stage of delusion-formation, 
represents an attempt at reconciliation with the external 
world from which the paranoid has withdrawn. In "The Loss 
of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis," Freud states: 
Now one might expect that when a psychosis 
breaks out something analogous to the process in 
a neurosis happens, though of course between 
different institutions in the mind; that is, 
that two steps may be discernible in a psychosis 
also, the first of which tears the ego away from 
reality, while the second tries to make good the 
damage done and re—establish the relation to 
reality at the expense of the id. And something 
of the kind can really be observed in a 
psychosis; there are indeed two stages in it, 
the second of which bears the character of a 
reparation—but then the analogy gives way to a 
far more extensive similarity in the two 
processes. The second step in a psychosis is 
also an attempt to make good the loss of 
reality, not, however, at the expense of a 
restriction laid upon the id—as in neurosis at 
the expense of the relation with reality—but in 
another, a more lordly manner, by creating a new 
reality which is no longer open to objections 
like that which has been forsaken" (Freud, Vol. 
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II, 278—270, italics from the original). 
Recalling the ear 1ier quote attributing Schreber's 
views of other people as "miracled up" and "cursory 
contraptions," the first stage of delusion formation would 
then include a withdrawal of libidinal cathexis to other 
people (and things) in which the subject had previously 
invested. At this level the first film, T&Kmin&tor echoes 
the first stage of delusion formation. Sarah Connor is 
systematically isolated from the people and life she once 
knew. Her roomrnate, Ginger, is killed. The police 
protecting her are killed. Her mother is killed. Toward 
the end only Kyle Reese remains, then even he is killed. 
The settings also reflect this alienation. Sarah 
starts out in a busy diner. Then the spectator sees her at 
home with Ginger preparing for a date who calls and 
cancels at the last minute. Sarah next shows up alone in a 
bar where she recognizes the immanent threat against her 
life while the other patrons* looks alienate her. She then 
moves to Tech Noir, a bustling nightclub filled with 
dancing couples—Sarah is alone. Here she meets Reese, 
and, after a wild chase scene through busy streets, they 
wind up at the police station—not perhaps as bustling as 
Tech Noir, but full of busy people all the same. Sarah is 
isolated from Reese. The next scene moves the couple to a 
culvert below the highway, separate but still in proximity 
to the flux of population. The motel scenes which follow 
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suggest seclusion, a hideaway where illicit lovers might 
meet. This is followed by another wild chase scene in 
which they return to the flux of the population, but the 
other people on the street are just obstacles to be 
surmounted, Repassed. And they finally end up in a 
deserted factory: just Sarah, Kyle, the terminator and 
automated production. And then there is one, Sarah. 
The second film elaborates a much different stage, 
that which tries to reconstruct the connection to people 
and things. Sarah and John move from relative isolation 
into small groups. Young John Connor begins the film with 
his friend, leaving behind his foster family to whom he 
has minimal attachments. They go to a video game arcade 
which is crowded, but the game player always plays alone. 
Then John is separated from his friend, but regroups with 
the T101 to go spring his mother from Pescadero Mental 
Hospital where she has willfully separated herself from 
all the others by affecting catatonic behavior. The 
subsequent group of three hooks up with Sarah's former 
gun—running compatriots, followed by the threesome's 
cooptation of the Dyson family. 
Though in the end only Sarah and John will be left, 
it is not in alienation. The factory, though it is 
evacuated, is not automated; traces of human activity 
abound. And though the father, as T101, is disposed of, it 
is through the affective bond to John (and Sarah a little 
bit) that he sacrifices himself for their future safety, 
safety which structures itself as a resolution between t 
homo&rotic threat and the breakdown of the signifying 
chain. The regressive, narcissistic ego—John Connor—ha 
acceded to the Imaginary bond with the primordial mother 
reconstructed as mechanical and masculine—the perfect, 
"lordly" reality "which is no longer open to objection 
like that which has been forsaken" Cop. cit. ). 
The Victims of Art 
The history of literary criticism endlessly recycles 
the question of what engages the reader of narratives, 
involves him or her in its chain of affects. The answers, 
numerous and varied though they seem, from theories of the 
sublime, mimesis and organic wholeness to postmodern 
conceptions such as reader-response, can all be reduced to 
the fulcrum of identification operations effecting the 
"willing suspension of disbelief." M.H. Abrams, in his 
essay "Belief and the Suspension of Disbelief," outlines 
the issue: 
The problem of belief, in one or another 
formulation, is no less ancient than criticism, 
and it has always been argued in terms of 
'knowledge,' 'truth,' and 'reality,' which are 
the cruxes of all philosophical disagreement. 
After twenty—five centuries, there seems greater 
weight than comfort in T.S. Eliot's weary 
conclusion that 'the problem of belief is very 
complicated and probably quite insoluble'" 
( Ab r ams, 1 -
In the end, Abrarns can only conclude that the "implicit 
but constant requisition of a serious literary work upon 
our predispositions and beliefs is not an end in itself, 
but a necessary means to engage our interest and feelings, 
in order to move them toward a resolution C3C>, italics 
mine)-
72 
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Here we have a theory of symptom and cure that takes 
its force primarily from the history of literary criticism 
as Abrams outlines it in his essay. Furthermore, this 
"cure" can be seen to rest (historically) on the process 
of identification: "There is no escaping the circumstance 
that a poet must submit to the conditions of human nature 
in order to be their master" (ibid.). Indeed, this sort of 
cure dependent upon the reader/spectator's identification 
with the hero(ine) of the narrative can be seen to operate 
as an underlying structure in the film Aliens as I 
previously discussed it in its function as "cure." But, 
this concept, the film as curative, fails in its 
conflation of the ideal ego with the ego ideal. It is as 
if the language of the film itself, the flow of images, 
refuses the narcissistic, primary identification with 
Ripley, at the very moment when she achieves a triumphant 
wholeness, by projecting the alien out from the screen 
toward the spectator. 
Of interest in this formula is the apparent need for 
the machinery of moral edification to attach itself to 
prelinguistic structures. This is the stuff of Aristotle's 
Rhetoric, which admonishes that tragedy should illustrate 
the struggles of an elevated personage in order to incite 
catharsis. Of course, Aristotle's catharsis is much more 
moderate than moral edification, but again and again, in 
dogmatic theories of poesy, one sees the return of the 
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elevated personage, the exemplum. Our heros are not our 
fathers; they are our mothers. For we do not wish to be 
like them; we wish to be thern. And if even the cinema of 
cure, with its ideological praxis intent on restoring 
culturally correct maternal activity, fails to cement the 
ideal ego with the ego ideal, how much more so must the 
cinema of symptom or the structurally paranoid film, in 
its very resistance to this sort of identification, fail 
to engage the spectator's conflated ideal ego/ego ideal? 
In these films, the spectator's position, in relation to 
the narrative, is inscribed as already outside; no 
hero(ine) stands as always already centrifuge of the 
diegesis and focal point for the spectator's primary 
narci ssi sm. 
The Abrams essay quoted above was published as part 
of the proceeds from a conference on literature and belief 
in 1957, and, while Abrams and the others were busy 
fnumbling about suspension of disbelief, i dent i f i cat i on , 
organic wholeness and the like, Walter Ong, in his essay 
"Voice as Summons for Belief," decided to take a more 
1anguage—oriented approach that comes closer to separating 
the two functions of identification, positing them as an 
intra-personal "I" and "thou": 
As he composes his thoughts in words, a speaker 
or writer hears these words echoing within 
himself and thereby follows his own thought, as 
though he were another person. Conversely, a 
hearer or reader repeats within himself the 
words he hears and thereby understands thern, as 
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though he were himself two individuals. This 
double and interlocking dialectic.-.provides the 
matrix for human communication. The speaker 
listens while the hearer speaks" (Ong, 83). 
He goes on to say that the assumption of a mask is 
inherent to communication, and "...voice demands 
role-playing, taking the part of the other within who is 
not ourselves"(88). What Ong delineates here can be seen 
as corresponding to the ego ideal as "reflection of one's 
idealized jsai identity in the secondary narcissism of 
relationships" (Ragland—Sul1ivan, 54)- At another level, 
these masks produce a remoteness which makes the text 
evoc at i ve: 
The reason for the corresponding heightening of 
effect seems to be the fact that all 
cornmuni c at i on takes place across barriers, or is 
an attempt to crash through barriers, namely, 
the barriers which bar the ultimate 
compenetration of the 'I' and the 'thou'" (Ong, 
99) . 
In positing an impulse toward mutual permeation of 
the 'I' and 'thou', Ong comes close to elaborating mirror 
stage meconna issanc-e r a primary identification that would 
correspond to the ideal ego. But, by placing both the 
distancing structure of the mask and the compenetrating 
heightening of effect within the field of language, Ong 
manages to separate the two while inverting them. It is 
the secondary identification with an other like but not 
the same as self which is primary to language, as the 
foundations of language are built through paternal 
intervention in the mother/child symbiosis. In the realm 
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of language, primary identification merely lends this 
structure heightened effect as a vestigal channel for 
affects, a sort of cross-current or under-tow that ends up 
adding force to the general flow. To wit, the ideal ego 
and the ego ideal elaborate themselves as separate in the 
process of psychic development through language 
acquisition. Ragland—Sul1ivan explains this process: 
In other words, language is such a distortion 
and deferral of experience that presubjective 
perception is repressed, albeit dynamically. The 
j»oi (which was initially mother-oriented) 
gradually comes to identify with the father as a 
secondary introjection identified with cultural 
ideals. While the (m)Other remains as the 
unconscious source of primary identity with 
objects of Desire, the father comes to represent 
conscious (i.e., public or social) ideals: a 
dual perspective coexists in the interior of the 
902" (56). 
It should be noted that presubjective perception includes 
the mirror stage and all that goes before it. Here we see 
that the impulse of moral edification to excite the 
primary lies in its necessity to make of the "morally 
correct" an object of desire rather than a public or 
social ideal. To the extent that morals or values, by 
their very definition, belong to the social, we see how 
what begins as ego ideal rapidly succumbs to ideal ego in 
a bizarre melange of the essential and the intentional. 
All this points to the fact that, if the 
reader/spectator *s position must be inscribed in the text 
to overcome defences, language itself necessitates a 
position of secondary identification which is not 
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conflated with the ideal ego. It is language itself, as 
something to be read, that must posit within the terms of 
its own articulation a position of anticipation and 
retroaction, a barrier to immediate coextention with 
subjectivity such as is implied in the Cartesian co^i to, a 
position to be inhabited by an other, a reader. 
Leaving aside for a moment the issue of language, and 
returning to Abrams' essay, he seems to outline just such 
a position in his discussion of the Divine Coxtedyi 
And the more credible and terrifying Dante, in 
his one function as moral monitor, makes the 
exemplary suffering of the damned, the more 
difficult he makes his other task of winning our 
emotional consent to the thesis that God is 
Love, and Hell follows. To this end Dante 
inserts himself, a mortal like us, into the poem 
as the experiential center through whose eyes 
and sensibility we invariably view Hell, as well 
as Purgatory and Heaven" (.'Abrams, 23!). 
Abrams delineates the perfect ego ideal position from 
which to experience the Divine Conedyi 
CDante] repeatedly misapplies his sympathy, 
feels an irrepressible admiration for the 
strength and dignity of some of the sinners in 
their ultimate adversity, weeps with such an 
abandon of fellow—feeling that Virgil must 
sternly reprimand him..." (ibid.>. 
Dante, as first—person narrator, "exhibits with entire 
credibility" the whole range of what is human in face of 
the eternal so that we may recognize ourselves in him. But 
Abrams' discussion elides the position of a parent/child 
dyad—Virgil/Dante—in his confusional apprehension of the 
mechanisms of identification. Abrams has separated the ego 
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ideal from the ideal ego, but only at the cost of 
excluding from his exegesis the function of primary 
identification. Virgil, as subject supposed to know, makes 
sense of Dante's excessive and uncontrolled reactions, and 
it is not without the mirror stage fusion of the more 
powerful Virgil with the childlike Dante that the reader 
appreciates the Divine Comedy. While the author of the 
Divine Comedy, on the one hand, has separated the ego 
ideal from the ideal ego, on the other hand he has fused 
them. The didactic intentions of his text necessitate both 
Dante as ego ideal and Virgil/Dante as ideal ego to 
"persuade us, against all our natural inclinations, that 
the Inferno, with its savage, repulsive and exquisitely 
ingenious tortures protracted in perpetuity, is not only 
required by God's justice but...is entailed by God's 
'Primal Love'" (ibid.). 
Dante's formula for reader identification also 
structures the cinema of cure in Aliens. Not only is it 
necessary that the spectator identify with Ripley as an 
ego ideal, the spectator also identifies with the ideal 
ego symbiosis of Ripley with the techo—mi 1itary apparatus, 
especially when Ripley assumes the hydrolic enhancement of 
the loader. But, whereas Aliens can be seen to overflow, 
diegetical1y, its own agenda, the Divine Comedy does not 
because, if one can identify with Dante—as—narrator and 
with the Virgil/Dante dyad, one may also take up the 
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position of Virgil as subject supposed to know. 
This is more or less the structure underlying the 
Terminator films. Of course, these films partake of both 
symptom and cure and do not follow the formula as does 
Dante's work, which rests wholly in the realm of the 
curative. The potential for each figure to serve as ego 
ideal in these films confounds a direct correspondent to 
the position of Dante-the-n<-irrator. And the dyads of 
mirror stage ideal ego are likewise fragmented. John 
Connor in the anticipatory mode fuses with Sarah and the 
TlOl by turns. Only through the John C-onnor of the future 
can any sort of cohesion emerge. It is John Connor of the 
future who functions in the position of 
Dante—the—narrator, engaging in a flow of ego ideals. And 
it is the dyad of John Connor, split between the 
anticipatory mode of the juvenile and the retroactive man 
he will become, that provides an ideal ego. Thus the 
figure of Virgil, who maintains a constant illusion of 
comprehension beside Dante—the-narrator's turbulent 
affective flux of ego ideals, provides a model for the 
formula embodied in John Connor of the future. 
In these films, however, ideal ego and ego ideal are 
separated by a source of articulation both beyond the text 
and across time, an articulation that mimics the structure 
of desire in language. It must be remembered that the self 
has an "anticipatory value" that reads both retroactively 
"toward primordial objects" and forward in "anticipation 
of an impossible, final fulfillment" which desire prevents 
from being harmonious. Language also functions according 
to this structure and is always received in anticipation 
of its final term but can only be given meaning or sense 
retroactively. Furthermore, both language and desire can 
be seen as issuing from an Other which is articulated 
within the text(self) as being outside the text(self). 
Given these parameters, one sees emerge a John Connor (as 
he will become) meant to conceal all the distances and 
gaps between the terms in the nexus of language, desire 
and identity. In other words, all this—time-loop, the 
rnetonomy of desire, and language itself — keeps me as a 
constant horizon of my own perception. The very flow of 
images which constitutes the film Cor words which 
constitute the written text) reiterates this time-loop and 
rnetonomy of desire. The flux of images activates desire in 
its structural essence. Only through rnetonomy does one 
produce the illusion of mot i on from a series of still 
photographs. It is language itself that constitutes the 
illusion of John Connor as he will become. And this 
illusion is the only possible "organic whole" we can make 
of either life or literature. 
Here, at the level of language, the reader or 
spectator enters the text, not as victim of art, but as 
illusion of understanding. In this regard, the ELIZA 
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Project from the field of Artificial Intelligence offers 
proof that this illusion of understanding can activate an 
affective engagement on the part of the reader/spectator. 
ELIZA, developed by Joseph Wei zenbaum, operates on the 
principle of matching patterns in English words and 
sentences. According to Pamela McCorduck, in her book 
Machines Mho Thinkr 
ELIZA was intended to simulate—or caricature, 
as Weizenbaum himself suggests—the conversation 
between a Rogerian psychoanalyst and a patient, 
with the machine in the role of analyst. There 
were a number of reasons for that choice. Partly 
it had to do with the illusions of mutual 
understanding that Weizenbaum senses human 
beings entertain" (McCorduck, 252) . 
Without delving into academic spats, Weizenbaum involved a 
Stanford collegue, a psychiatrist named Kenneth Colby, who 
developed a sister program, DOCTOR;. The association turned 
out to be rocky, and Weizenbaum became concerned: "Though 
it did indeed simulate the conversation between a 
psychotherapist and a patient, Weizenbaum was convinced 
that it might be mi sunderstood as giving some insight into 
therapy, into madness" (253). And it was precisely on this 
point that the association broke up. ELIZA and her avatar, 
DOCTOR, have obvious and irrefutable shortcomings as 
psychotherapeutic applications; they fall far short of the 
mechanisms of transference, and the programs are easily 
fooled because they do not rely on any kind of 
understanding, being merely a process of "matching and 
classi fication." But the project illuminates some 
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inteyesting aspects of lanquage: 
ELIZA is seductive, and its protocols are 
wonderfully funny to read—that is, as long as 
you remember that the conversation is taking 
place between a computer and a human being, and 
not between two humans. But that distinction is 
very hard to maintain, at least for the human 
involved" (254). 
McCorduck goes on to describe a demonstration in which 
"the conversation suddenly became intimate": 
•ur visitor, an internationally respected 
computer scientist, who knew very well that 
there was a computer at the other end of the 
line and not a human being, nevertheless began 
to disclose his worries about his wife, his 
children, his distance—both geographical and 
emotional — from thern. We watched in painful 
embarrassment, trying hard not to look, yet 
mesmerized all the same. Something about that 
impartial machine had evoked a response from the 
visitor that the norms of polite human conduct 
forbade" (254). 
Whether in the impartial machine of cinema or the 
resistance of the written text, language, itself an 
illusion of understanding and an impartial machine, 
elicits reciprocation, an affective investment through 
that very same "heightening" effect Ong described. 
Language can always only give the illusion of fusion, an 
illusion we are driven to cling to through the trauma of 
castration, which, for Lacan, lies in the paternal 
intervention between mother and child as a symbiotic 
whole. ELIZA has, on other occasions, demonstrably failed 
the "Turing Test" for qualification as an artificial 
intelligence (Alan Turing proposed that the true test of 
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artificial intel 1 igence would be a dialogue in which the 
machine produced language usage that could not be 
determined from its human counterpart's). Still, the 
project, in its limited access to language, points to 
important psychical structures that certainly bear on our 
reception of language as it is embodied in texts. 
ELIZA evokes mechanisms that approximate repetition 
automat i sin, the tendency of the subject to repeat 
unpleasant experiences in disregard of the pleasure 
principle. Lacan delineates repetition automatism in his 
Sem inatr on "The Par Joined Letter"s 
Our inquiry has led us to the point of 
recognizing that the repetition automatism 
( H iederhol un<gszuang > finds its basis in what we 
have called the insistence of the signifying 
chain. We have elaborated that notion itself as 
a correlate of the ex—sistence Cors eccentric 
place) in which we must necessarily locate the 
subject of the unconscious if we are to take 
Freud's discovery seriously. As is known, it is 
in the realm of experience inaugurated by 
psychoanalysis that we may grasp along what 
imaginary lines the human organism, in the most 
intimate recesses of its being, mani fests its 
capture in a symbolic dimension" (Lacan, 28). 
Here Lacan seems to be articulating another victim—the 
being captured in a symbolic dimension eccentric to 
itself. For it is also "the symbolic order which is 
constitutive for the subject" (20). In other words, this 
position, "the decisive orientation which the subject 
receives from the itinerary of a signi fier" (ibid.) will 
also be the position of subjectivity in relation to a 
text. This differs from the previously described processes 
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of identification in that it is through following the 
signi fier, by reading, that one iterates the internal "I" 
and "thou" eternally opposed to the unary self of mirror 
stage meconnaissance. The imaginary identifications 
associated with the victim's position fade in the presence 
of the signifying chain which governs foreclosure, 
repression and denial, the displacements of the signifier. 
Subjects in language "follow so faithfully the 
displacement (.Entstellang) of the signi f ier that imaginary 
factors, despite their inertia, figure only as shadows and 
reflections in the process" (ibid). This echoes Ong's 
proposition that the ego ideal of primary meconnaissance 
on the other side of the barrier lends the text its 
heightened effect, while ego ideals function in language 
use as the assumption of a mask. In Lacanian terms, the 
unconscious is the discourse of the other. What takes this 
beyond the position of the victim is the fact that this 
split opens a voi d within the subject, "and if the first 
thing to make itself heard is the void, it is within 
himself that he will experience it, and it is beyond 
speech that he will seek a reality to fill this void" 
(Function and Field of Speech and Language, 40). So, while 
this void fuels our suspension of disbelief, making us 
seek a reality in the text, the fact that text is language 
undermines any promise of completion and aggrandisement. 
In the Seminar, Lacan elaborates the itinerary of the 
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signi fier r the purloined letter, and the intersubjective 
rol6s that its possession dictates to the various 
characters in the narrative, while simultaneously 
delineating the manner in which the signifier is emptied 
of all meaning until it becomes what only the signifier 
can become—the only means of presence for that absolute 
absence, death. It is this lack which functions as both 
cause and result of the repetition automatism enacted by 
the characters as they repeat the positions of the 
itinerary- The Queen, in confiding her lack of the 
letter—its theft— to the police, has already divested 
the letter of its message. Because she tells the police 
the message contained in the letter, the message has no 
value. It no longer represents an interpersonal relation 
between herself and its author. And Dupin, in taking up 
the position of Minister D , divests the letter of its 
meaning in the blackmail plot by stealing it, thus putting 
Minister D in the position of the Queen, the position of 
lack. Dupin himself must activate a subsequent meaning for 
the letter in its value as hostage for monetary reward, 
and in this act he takes up the position vacated first by 
the Queenf then by Minister D . Once he has "sold" the 
letter back to the police, it no longer represents 
monetary reward. The letter, in its essential emptiness, 
in that it cannot mean what is written on it but instead 
roust perform as the presence of an absence, necessitates 
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the values it is given. At the same time, its very 
emptiness—its definition as signifier—results from its 
exchange. Lacan explains the way in which this fact 
constitutes subjectivity: 
So runs the signi fier's answer, above and beyond 
all signification: 'You think you act when I 
stir you at the mercy of the bonds through which 
I knot your desires. Thus do they grow in force 
and multiply in objects, bringing you back to 
the fragmentation of your shattered childhood. 
So be it: such will be your feast until the 
return of the stone guest I shall be for you 
since you call me forth.'" (52!) 
The absolute power of the signifier articulates us as 
its victims; victims of the signifier, as Lacan imputes to 
the itinerary of the signifier the status of "truth" and 
the power "which makes the very existence of fiction 
possible" <29). Dn this basis, Derrida will make his 
argument against Lacan's "reading," calling Lacan "The 
Purveyor of Truth" (in the French title, "Le Facteur de la 
verite," the word faeteur plays as both postman and 
factor). And Derrida takes as his point of departure 
Lacan's neutralization of the narrator: "...the witness's 
fidelity is the cowl which blinds and lays to rest all 
criticism of his testimony" (36). Here, on this 
neutralized ground, Derrida perceives a factor of the 
truth in fiction: 
To what does this neutralization of the narrator 
commit the Seminar? 
1. The narrator (himself doubled into a 
narrating narrator and a narrated narrator, not 
limiting himself to reporting the two dialogues) 
is evidently neither the author himself (to be 
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called Poe), nor, less evidently, the inscriber 
of a text which recounts something for us, or 
rather which makes a narrator speak, who 
himself, in all kinds of ways, makes many people 
speak. The inscriber and the inscribing are 
original functions that are not to be confused 
with either the author and his action, or with 
the narrator and his narration, and even less 
with the particular object, the narrated 
content..." (Derrida, 179). 
Derrida's inscriber and inscribing inhabit a space outside 
the text as textuality that seems to echo Ong's "Other" 
within us. It also might be confused with language, the 
itinerary of the signifier. But it is necessary to the 
elaboration of Lacan's obfuscation of the account's 
structure as narrative which allows Derrida to point out 
the shift of scene in Lacan's reading: 
This lack permits the scene of the signifier to 
be reconstrueted into a signified (a process 
always inevitable in the logic of the sign), 
permits writing to be reconstructed into the 
written, the text into discourse, and more 
precisely into an *intersubjective' dialogue 
(and it is not fortuitous that the Seminar's 
commentary concerns only the two dialogued parts 
of "The Purloined Letter")" (180). 
From this vantage point, Derrida critiques Lacan for 
making a "whole" out of the narrated content while 
obliviating the "whole" of the narration, not only 
disincorporating the narrator, but the other two tales in 
the triptych as well. In other words, the Lacanian 
itinerary reduces the reader to a narcissistic ideal ego 
within the text, overlooking any secondary ego ideal 
positions available. 
Derrida makes any number of interesting points in 
addition to those I have brought out, and indeed the two 
readings both Lacan's and Derrida's—indicate a whole 
cluster of confusions and contradict ions both within the 
psychoanalytic framework and outside of it. I cannot 
possibly do justice here to all of these issues, but focus 
instead on the potential between the two readings for a 
position within signification from which to recuperate the 
victim of art. While Derrida's reading points out certain 
limitations in Lacan's, Lacan's reading certainly points 
out a verifiable structure that cannot be dismissed as 
purely psychoanalytic hocus-pocus. Lacan omits certain 
items in his intent on making a lesson of Poe's tale, and 
here we return to that odd relationship articulated 
between didacticism and the victim of art, but this does 
nothing to disprove what he says. 
It is indeed through the itinerary of the signifier 
in its representation of lack that we engage a fiction, 
and thus we cannot escape being the victims of the 
signifier. But fiction, the whole of the work, is also a 
signifying formation masking a void and, as such, 
constitutes itself as a symptom. This does not suggest we 
need be victims of art. We enjoy art as a symptom. In The 
Stit* 1 inObject- of Ideology, Slavoj Zizek articulates two 
stages in the psychoanalytic process, interpretation of 
symptoms and going through the fantasy: 
When we are confronted with the patient's 
symptoms, we must first interpret them and 
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penetrate through them to the fundamental 
fantasy as the kernel of enjoyment which is 
blocking the further movement of the 
interpretation; then we must accomplish the 
crucial step of going through the fantasy, of 
obtaining distance from it, of experiencing how 
the fantasy-formation just masks, fills out a 
certain void, lack, empty place in the Other" 
CZizek, 74). 
But problems arise when the symptom is held onto even 
beyond the fantasy, to which Lacan posed the concept of 
sinthomei "Symptom as sinthome is a certain signifying 
formation penetrated with enjoyment: it is a signifier as 
a bearer of jouis-se-nse, enjoyment-in —sense" (75). Zizek 
goes on to say that the sinthoae "is not enchained in a 
network but immediately filled, penetrated with enjoyment" 
<76). This is the position held out to us by Roe's 
narrator- While he includes himself in the narrative, he 
is not on the itinerary of the signifier so to speak; he 
never takes possession of the letter. He partakes of the 
process of language, its anticipatory and retrospective 
elements, through his recounting of the tale, but he 
avoids the primary identification necessitated by moral 
edification in his silence when the moral of the story 
would be ennunciated. The story ends in Dupin's voice. The 
narrator gives us no interpretation, no evidence that his 
account bears Truth or even implies his opinion of the 
whole matter. He merely takes pleasure in it: "At Paris, 
just after dark one gusty evening in the autumn of 18 , I 
was enjoying the twofold luxury of meditation and a 
meerschaum..." (Poe, 6). Poe's narrator, like ELIZA, gives 
us the impression of having understood, but he nowhere 
indicates his knowledge; he is in the story to ask 
pertinent questions. Zizek explains the relation between 
truth, enjoyment and the s in thooe thus: 
From this perspective of the sinthomer truth and 
enjoyment are radically incompatible: the 
dimension of truth is opened through our 
misrecognition of the traumatic Thing, embodying 
the impossible jouissance" (Zizek, 79). 
It should come then as no surprise that the position 
of sint-hoxe is the diegetically mapped out position of the 
spectator in the cinema of symptom as it is elaborated in 
the film Alien. Ripley activates no mirror stage 
aeconna iss&nee because the truth of the traumatic Thing is 
impossible jouissance. The alien, in its reproductive 
incorporation of the host, represents the end of the 
mother and the reign of the M(0)ther, the symbiotic 
child/mother whole. Instead, though we tend to form a 
secondary bond with her in the end, we generally take our 
pleasure from the safe distance of the omniscient camera 
work. We are there only to ask pertinent questions, to 
assume the illusion of understanding until the diegesis 
answers us, to make "jouis—sense" of the mystery. This is 
also the position outlined for us in the figure John 
Connor of the future in the Terminator films. We take up 
this position, exclusive of its fusional tendencies 
regarding the young John Connor, through the agency of the 
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pseudo-historical voice-overs and numerous other referents 
insuring the distance of time. The spectator's position is 
not that of the detective, Dupin, who must make truth or 
meaning of the narrative, but that of the narrator who 
makes a pleasure of the tale as a telling. In "Towards a 
Psychoanalyt i c Reading of the System(s) of a Contemporary 
American Film," Barbara Learning writes of a system that 
echoes Ong's speaker hearing/1istener speaking: 
Thus the analyst who writes the reading/reads 
the writing of the filmic text is quite 
different from the critic as detective. For the 
detective works with a corpse, a crime that is 
already done, and his work is simply passive 
reconstruction of a wor k which is already 
closed. The detective works to remove chaos by 
reading the clues, to erase disorder first of 
all by assigning guilt, by limiting the range of 
its infective possibilities. The psychoanalyst 
cannot assign guilt for the crime is only being 
written in the analysis" (Learning, 16). 
The position which Leaming accounts to the psychoanalyst, 
like that of the narrator of Roe's tale or that of the 
sJntham&f engages the signifying chain without investing 
in the letter. Roe's narrator never takes possession of 
the letter, never gives it a value from which he profits. 
He merely takes pleasure in its passage, both writing and 
reading the itinerary. Though we may be the victims of the 
signifier, inescapably captured in its network, we are not 
the victims of art. 
Indeed, roost fictions offer such a position of 
si»thane in the narrative structure, whether it be through 
a first—person narrator or through the omniscience of the 
narrator. The only fiction that seems to fall prey to the 
•econnai^^ance inherent to the itinerary of the signifier 
is that which also falls under the heading didactic or 
morally edifying. It is possible to posit reading from the 
sin thorns as a more general practice. In his essay, 
"Reading," Maurice Blanchot advocates a similar position: 
"True reading never challenges the true book: but it is 
not a form of submission to the 'text' either" (Blanchot, 
95) . If he posits a true reading and a true book, Blanchot 
does not appoint a truth to the readings 
Reading, in the sense of literary reading, is 
not even a pure movement of comprehension, the 
kind of understanding that tries to sustain 
meaning by setting it in motion again. Reading 
is situated beyond comprehension or short of 
comprehension" (96). 
Blanchot, the reader, will not fall victim to the sort of 
primary identifications Dupin does when he sets the letter 
on its appointed course. He chooses instead the illusion 
of comprehension which is not without its enjoyment. One 
may fear that this is a pale enjoyment in comparison, but 
the position of the sinthowe does not remove us from the 
text; it merely frees us from being its victims. Blanchot 
seems to understand this: 
Even if it demands that the reader enter a zone 
in which he has no air and the ground is hidden 
from him, even if, beyond these stormy 
approaches, reading seems to be a kind of 
participation in the open violence that is the 
work, in itself reading is a tranquil and silent 
presence, the pacified center of excess, the 
silent Yes that lies at the heart of every 
storm" (97). 
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Reading from the sinthome allows us to participate- in the 
text without becoming the victims of its truth, for we are 
captured by the signi fier , our inescapable and 
constitutive factor, but we need not attempt to pass it 
^r laden with our own imaginary processes, as ideal 
object. To indulge the itinerary of the signifier with a 
role as signified, is to abolish its truth, its emptiness, 
and play its victim. Blanchot admonishes against this sort 
of reading: 
And when Valery worries about today's 
uncultivated reader who demands that facility 
accompany his reading, this worry may be 
justified, but the culture of an attentive 
reader, the scruples of a reading filled with 
devotion, an almost religious reading, one that 
has become a sort of cult, would not change 
anything; it would create even more serious 
dangers, because although the lightness of a 
casual reader, dancing quickly around the text, 
may not be true lightness, it has no 
consequences and holds a certain promise: it 
proclaims the happiness and innocence of 
reading, which may in fact be a dance with an 
invisible partner in a separate space, a joyful, 
wild dance with the 'tomb.' Lightness from which 
we must not hope for the impulse of a graver 
concern, because where we have lightness, 
gravity is not lacking" (98). 
The lightness of reading as an end in itself, as an end to 
meaning, means a recognition that the signifier structures 
the position, the subject, but the position is not one. 
The position, the subject is neither singular, nor 
monumental Truth. 
As victims of art we label movies and recordings. As 
victims of art we periodically "cleanse the trainstation 
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bookstores" (Michel Maffesoli, forthcoming, 1392). As 
victims of art we opened fire on the National Endowment 
for the Arts' support of works such as those of 
Maplethorpe. As victims of art we campaign against 
pornography. And all to no effect. We are as much 
prisoners of the signifier now as we were before the NEA 
got "c1eaned—up," and pornography thrives no matter the 
censorship of the moral majority (cf. Mafffesoli). It does 
not necessarily follow that record albums provoke suicide 
and witchcraft in teens, because these cultural artifacts 
inscribe in their very nature as language the position of 
the sinthowe. Zizek, in describing the end of the 
psychoanalytic process as identification uith the symptom, 
points to a social responsibility beyond censorship: "The 
analysis achieves its end when the patient is able to 
recognize, in the Real of his symptom, the only support of 
his being" (Zizek, 75). Art is always only art; yet it 
serves the sociality in its circulation as culture; it 
provides the being with an Other from which desire is 
articulated. And whether or not one views this desire as 
"desirable," it still must be signified in the symptom. 
How much better if we should recognize the symptom as 
symptom, as part of our "culture of hate," as 
constitutional of ourselves and engage the s in t-hone. Lacan 
may have been able to say there is no cure, but he also 
elaborated certain anodyne properties of psychoanalysis. 
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We may acknowledge that we fall under the spell of art, 
but we must also acknowledge that we need not be its 
victims. 
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